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AMODAL COMPLETION AND THE IMPURITY OF PERCEPTION¹

abstract

Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – maintain that perception is pure presentation. That is, a perceptual experience has no commitments that exceed what is given or presented in the experience. I argue The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of amodal completion. I distinguish three Purist strategies for addressing amodal completion, and suggest that none is very promising.

keywords

Perception; Amodal completion; Perceptual filling-in; Naïve realism

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1. Prelude Towards the end of his early book on Husserl, *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida makes a baffling pronouncement: “There never was any ‘perception’” (Derrida, 1973, p. 103). What might he have meant by this? The next, and final, page of the book contains a clue: “[C]ontrary to what phenomenology – which is always phenomenology of perception – has tried to make us believe, ... the thing itself always escapes” (Derrida, 1973, p. 104). Derrida’s point seems to be something like the following. First, perception is supposed to be the brute or pure presentation of an object to consciousness. Second, Husserl’s phenomenology unwittingly, and contrary to Husserl’s official announcements, shows that there is no such pure presentation – presentation is always impure, since it always encompasses the representation of something not presented, something absent (cf. Derrida, 1973, p. 103). Therefore, finally, Husserl’s phenomenology teaches us – unbeknownst to Husserl himself – that perception is a fiction. Interpreting Derrida is a tricky business, and I don’t want to pretend that this thumbnail sketch does his text justice. But whatever Derrida might have meant, his pronouncement, and the context surrounding it, suggests a view some possible philosopher – call him Derrida* – might take. Derrida*’s view is one way of negotiating the following inconsistent triad:

- (1) Perception occurs.
- (2) Perception is the pure presentation of objects, property instances, events (etc.) in the world.
- (3) There is no pure presentation of objects, property instances, events (etc.) in the world.

Derrida*’s response to this triad – abandoning (1) – is singularly implausible. To see, hear, and smell is to perceive. Of course people see, hear, and so on. So of course perception occurs all the time. That leaves two other responses to the inconsistent triad. Husserl’s own view is that (2) has to be rejected. He is very explicit about this. In *Analyses of Active and Passive Synthesis*, for example Husserl insists that perception “is only possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there” (Husserl, 2001, p. 40). Husserl’s point is that a perceptual experience is never pure presentation: it always includes a “co-consciousness” of “sides” or aspects of objects, which are not given or presented, strictly speaking. The remaining option is to reject (3) and maintain that perception really is pure presentation. Such a view has, perhaps, been defended by Frege and Austin (Travis, 2004; 2013). At any rate,

it is defended by contemporary philosophers like Charles Travis, Bill Brewer, and others. Call theirs “The Pure View”,¹ and Husserl’s “The Impure View”.²

I don’t think The Pure View is very plausible. As I shall suggest in this paper, The Pure View seems unable to offer a convincing account of the sorts of phenomena that led Husserl to reject (2): putative cases in which perceptual experience goes beyond what is presented, anticipating something that is not there in the stimulus. Specifically, I will focus on cases of what the Belgian vision scientist (and phenomenologist) Albert Michotte dubbed “amodal completion”.

Defenders of The Pure View – “Purists”, as I shall call them – must show that alleged examples of impure perception are merely apparent. They must argue that the impurity, if there is any such, is not due to perception, strictly speaking, but to some other mental state or episode. I will consider three Purist strategies for explaining away amodal completion in this fashion, and suggest that none is very promising.

The structure of the paper is the following. In the next section, I introduce The Pure View. In section 3, I present three Purist strategies for handling potential counterexamples. Section 4 argues that none of those strategies yields a convincing account of amodal completion. Section 5 addresses an objection and summarizes the argument of the paper.

According to The Pure View, perceptual experiences never make any “claims”, or have any commitments about the environment that go beyond what is strictly presented or given in the experiences themselves. Indeed, some Purists insist that there are simply *no* commitments in perception to things being one way or another in the environment. In Charles Travis’ words, “*perception, as such, simply places our surroundings in view; affords us awareness of them. There is no commitment to their being one way or another*” (Travis, 2004, p. 65). Perceptual experiences, then, are in a sense “silent” or – in Austin’s phrase – “dumb”.

But as I understand The Pure View here, it need not be committed to Travis’ “silence of the senses” view. In particular, a Purist can maintain that a perceptual experience can be committed to things “being one way or another” as long as their being that way is *given* or *presented* in the experience without remainder, so that there is no possibility of things not being that way.

What no Purist can accept is the idea that perception has commitments that exceed what is given or presented. For if perception carried commitments to things being this or that way that exceeded what was presented in perception, the possibility would arise that those commitments were erroneous. And *that* possibility is anathema to Purists of any stripe. For Purists, there is no such thing as erroneous or non-veridical perception, strictly speaking. Thus, for Travis: “Perception cannot present things as other than they are. It cannot present some ways things are *not* as what is so” (Travis, 2004, p. 65). Bill Brewer concurs:

[I]n perceptual experience, a person is simply presented with the actual constituents of the physical world themselves. Any errors in her world-view which result are products of the subject’s responses to the experience, however automatic, natural or

2. The Pure View

1 Sense-datum theorists (e.g. Broad, 1927) were perceptual purists of sorts, but since they did not take perception to be the pure presentation of objects (etc.) *in the world*, they do not count as defenders of The Pure View as that view is understood here.

2 If we think of intentionality as involving mentally “aiming” at something not given or presented (cf. Travis, 2013, p. 220), then the issue between The Pure View and its opponents concerns whether perception is intentional. Defenders of the former think not: “[S]eeing, at least seeing what is before you, remains non-intentional” (Travis, 2013, p. 221).

understandable in retrospect these responses might be. *Error*, strictly speaking, given how the world actually is, is never an essential feature of experience itself. (Brewer, 2006, p. 169)

James Genone, another Purist, denies “that perceptual error is so much as possible” (Genone, 2014, p. 344).

All these philosophers defend versions of a view currently known as “naïve realism” or “the relational view”. But Purist ideas have arisen within the “enactivist” movement, as well.³ For Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin, for example, “Perceiving is, in and of itself, contentless – it lacks inherent conditions of satisfaction” (2013, p. 134). Thus, perceptual experiences

do not have built-in conditions of satisfaction, nor do they possess veridical [sic!] content that is accurate or inaccurate, true or false. If basic perceptual experiences – even those of the phenomenally conscious sort – possess no content, then there is simply no question of their being true or false, veridical or unveridical. (Hutto & Myin 2013, p. 87; cf. p. 134)

In short, then, Purists claim perception is the pure presentation of bits of a perceiver’s environment. If perception is “committal” with respect to how things are in the environment – which not all Purists accept – the relevant commitments do not go beyond what is strictly *given* perceptually. Hence, perception can never present things as being different from the way they are.

3. Three Purist Strategies

Before I turn to the question of whether amodal completion could present a counterexample to The Pure View, I want to consider some ways in which Purists might attempt to handle other potential counterexamples in the vicinity of amodal completion. Amodal completion belongs to a family of phenomena that are sometimes collected under the heading of visual perceptual “filling-in” (Weil & Rees, 2011). Peter De Weerd offers the following general characterization of perceptual filling-in: “Visual perceptual filling-in refers to the interpolation of information across a region in the visual environment in the absence of any physical evidence for that information in that region” (De Weerd, 2006, p. 227). “Interpolation” means that the missing information is filled in on the basis of the information that is physically present in the surrounding area. So the basic idea is that the perceptual system adds information that is not present in the perceptual stimulus. This sounds like it might be precisely the sort of thing Purists deny is possible – viz. cases in which perception goes beyond what is strictly given or presented. However, Purists have various ways of responding, depending on the precise nature of the case.

First, consider Troxler fading (Fig. 1). In Troxler fading – or Troxler’s effect – stimuli surrounding a fixated object slowly fade away. It seems Purists can easily handle this sort of case. For it is not clear there is any experiential filling-in going on. In Troxler fading, subjects fail to see something that is there. But that does not mean that something else – the background – is “filled in” to replace what is not seen. In general, failing to spot *x* is not tantamount to perceptually representing *y* ($\neq x$). If it were, then given that we overlook things all the time, virtually all our perceptual experiences would be grossly non-veridical.

³ For more detailed expositions and discussions of naïve realism, see Overgaard (2021a; 2021b). I discuss enactivist views in Overgaard (2017).



Fig. 1. **Troxler fading.** Fixate the cross. After a while, the blob on the right disappears.

Other cases of filling-in must be handled differently, however. In “modal completion” (Michotte *et al.*, 1991), for example, an observer has a visual impression of a figure or surface where none is present in the stimulus. The Kanisza square (Fig. 2) is a standard case of modal completion. It seems as though there is a bright white square in the foreground, partially occluding (blocking from view) four black discs. Yet the foregrounded square is illusory. The image only contains four “pac men”, suitably arranged. The illusory square seems to be added, experientially, to the image. And thus it can hardly be denied that filling-in is occurring.



Fig 2. **Modal completion.** Kanisza square.

What Purists *can* say, however, is that the relevant filling-in is not strictly *perceptual*. Three strategies suggest themselves: First, Purist can maintain that beliefs or judgements are doing the filling-in. Second, they can maintain that (partial) hallucinations are responsible. Finally, they can say that filling-in is accomplished by mental imagery.

Consider the *doxastic* strategy first. The idea is that in Fig. 2, it is not your visual experience that fills in the missing contours of a square. Rather, there seems to be a white square in the sense that you believe or judge – or are at least inclined to believe or judge – that there is such a thing. The doxastic strategy might work for modal completion. A naïve subject, going by a real-life example of a Kanisza square, would surely be inclined to believe or judge that there was a square object present. Maybe we do not need to posit an underlying *perceptual* representation of such an object. Maybe the doxastic representation is all we need.

If the doxastic strategy does not seem viable, the Purist can opt for the *hallucination* strategy instead. The basic idea here is to argue that a partial hallucination is responsible for the added contours in Fig. 2. Hallucinations, however, are not perceptions.⁴ And so, contrary to the way it is advertised, the “perceptual” filling-in in such a case is not strictly perceptual after all. It therefore poses no threat to the Pure View.

Perhaps the hallucination strategy can yield a plausible account of modal completion. It vividly seems to you that as though a bright white square is there in the image; yet there is no

⁴ Strictly speaking, the Purist needs to maintain something stronger than this. Almost everyone agrees that hallucinations are not perceptions. The question is whether there must be an *experiential* difference between perception and hallucination. To keep things simple, I will assume for the sake of the argument that Purists have succeeded in explaining away a potential counterexample if they can make it plausible that a partial hallucination is responsible for the anti-Purist feature invoked.

such thing. This seems a textbook case of visual hallucination – a “perception” or perceptual experience without an object.

Should the hallucination strategy fail, a third strategy is available to the Purist: the *imagery* strategy. To opt for this strategy is to maintain that filling-in is achieved by way of mental imagery. Now, as a rule, imagery tends to be less compelling than perception. We rarely mistake our imaginations for reality. Thus, the less convincing or compelling the filling-in would be, the more plausible would be the suggestion that imagery is responsible. To the extent that the added contours in Fig. 2 are experienced as less than compelling, the imagery strategy might seem promising. Does it *really* look as though an actual square is present in the image? If not, perhaps that is because what is doing the filling-in here is visual imagery rather than a partial hallucination.

Purists can also avail themselves of these strategies when trying to account for other cases of allegedly perceptual filling-in. Take filling-in at the blind spot, for example (Fig. 3).



Fig. 3. Filling in at the blind spot. Close your right eye and fixate the cross with your left. Move closer to the figure. When the distance is right, the gap in the bar seems to be filled.

Here it clearly seems as if missing information is added. The broken bar is visually completed; a piece is “inserted” to fill the gap.⁵ Perhaps one is not tempted to believe that an obviously broken bar is suddenly complete when the gap falls on the blind spot, and so perhaps the doxastic strategy has little *prima facie* plausibility. But then it seems the Purist can invoke a partial hallucination (you have a vivid visual experience of something that is not there) or perhaps appeal to visual imagery (does it *really* seem as though the bar is complete, or does the fragility of the experience perhaps suggest that this is more like imagery?).

The question I now want to consider is whether any of these strategies yields a plausible explanation of cases of amodal completion.

4. Amodal Completion

Cases of amodal completion are importantly different from the other kinds of perceptual filling-in that we have discussed so far. Consider how the Belgian vision scientist Albert Michotte – who coined the term “amodal completion” (or amodal “complements”: *compléments amodaux*; see van Lier & Gerbino, 2015 for discussion of the translation) – says about Fig. 4:

[T]here is a gap in the stimulation from the rectangle underneath, but this gap is somehow inoperative, since the subjects say that they perceive two complete rectangles. ... There is no question of transparency, and the subjects themselves are emphatic that although they “see” two complete rectangles, it is quite clear that the one underneath is hidden at the crossing point. For this reason Michotte has proposed that completions that are “present” in this manner should be termed “amodal” [...]. (Michotte *et al.*, 1991, pp. 143-144)

Notice the scare quotes around “see” and “present”. The point is that although subjects have a vivid sense of being in perceptual contact with two complete rectangles, it does not seem to them as if they actually *see* both rectangles in their entirety. Part of one rectangle seems to be hidden behind the other, and thus out of view.

⁵ Ramachandran (1992) has examples that are even more striking.



Fig. 4. **Amodal completion.** After Michotte *et al.* (1991).

Given that human beings live in environments that tend to be “cluttered”, as Gibson puts it (1986, p. 78), perceived objects are frequently, indeed mostly, partially covered by other objects. As a consequence, full information about an object is rarely available, and the ability to somehow fill in the missing information is therefore crucial. As Michotte and colleagues put it:

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of these perceptual completions. To convince ourselves of this we need only cast a critical eye about us, at the furniture in a room, for example, or at the traffic in a street. It is astonishing how rare it is to find examples of objects where the side facing the observer is completely uncovered. Nearly all of them have parts hidden by other objects (screens), and despite this the shapes we see are neither interrupted nor breeched. Indeed it is clear that the world as it appears to us is not made up of fragments of objects but of things with a complete shape presented to us this way despite the partial and temporary concealment that happens to them. This is to a great extent due to the formation of amodal completions, which are thus seen to be an essential factor in the phenomenal permanence of things and consequently also in the adequate adaptation of the behaviour of humans and animals to the environment in which they live. (Michotte *et al.*, 1991, p. 165)

Stressing the crucial importance of amodal completion, however, is one thing, which presumably will find little opposition. It is quite another thing to suppose, as Michotte also seems to, that amodal completion is a *perceptual* phenomenon after all. The world “appears to us” as made up of “things with a complete shape”, say Michotte *et al.* Things are “presented to us in this way”; we “see” things in this way. However, that perceptual interpretation of amodal completion will be challenged by the Purist. For the commitment to some object continuing *behind* another object, perhaps in a determinate fashion, is clearly one that goes beyond what is given or *presented* experientially. Moreover, it is one that could be false. Indeed, as regards Michotte *et al.*'s illustration (Fig. 4), it is false. There is nothing continuing behind the complete rectangle. Thus, the Purist must reject that amodal completion is a genuine feature of perceptual experience. The ubiquity and importance of the phenomenon makes the task all the more urgent, as this can hardly be considered an odd outlier to be contrasted with run-of-the-mill perceptual experience. If amodal completion is genuinely perceptual, it is a feature of run-of-the-mill perception.

The question, then, is whether the Purist's strategies work for amodal completion. First, let us consider the hallucinatory strategy. Can the Purist suggest that the amodally completed part of an object is simply hallucinated? The short answer, I think, is no. When you hallucinate, you seem to perceive things that aren't there. It is a necessary condition on hallucinating *x* that it seems to you as though you *perceive x*. But it precisely does *not* seem to you as if you perceive amodally completed parts. Already Michotte *et al.*

(and their subjects) were very clear on that: those parts seem to be hidden from view. The hallucinatory strategy founders on this simple point.⁶

The doxastic strategy seems much more promising, however. Perhaps you don't *believe* that there are two complete rectangles in Fig. 4, but you certainly feel the pull towards so believing. Indeed, it may only be your background knowledge that this is merely a two-dimensional drawing that is preventing you from giving in to that pull. In real-life cases, you might be hard pressed not to believe the completed portion is really there.

The doxastic strategy can be challenged, however, by cases in which it seems we clearly *do not* believe what we amodally complete. Consider Fig. 5. You will not need to be persuaded that this is no ordinary triangle. Now cover the X section with a finger or pencil. The triangle is now amodally completed as though it were an ordinary triangle. Yet do you now *believe* that it is an ordinary triangle?



Fig. 5. Michotte's "triangle". Occlude the section where the lines cross with a finger or a pen, and the triangle seems perfectly normal. After Michotte *et al.* (1991).

The Purist might want to dig in her heels at this point. Perhaps you have background knowledge or beliefs about triangles, which, when the X bit is covered, leads you to infer that the triangle is an ordinary one. To be sure, this belief will not eradicate your original belief. Thus, the Purist now has to assume you hold an inconsistent set of beliefs. You firmly believe the triangle to be highly irregular – indeed not a triangle at all. And yet you also believe in some sense, or are inclined to believe, that it is a normal triangle.

Philosophers are often keen to point out that it may not be all that strange or unusual for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs. So perhaps the Purist's case is not implausible. However, let me make three points vis-à-vis this suggestion. First of all, notice how different our scenario is from a standard case of inconsistent beliefs. To take a Sartrean sort of example, I can believe firmly that I am courageous. Yet I can also know (hence believe) that I've run away from conflicts again and again. I may also believe that a courageous person is one who does not avoid conflict. The inconsistency can persist, however, because I somehow fail to connect the dots. It is a lot harder for *blatantly* inconsistent beliefs to co-exist. One tends to give way to the other. In the present case, however, we seem to adopt, out of the blue, a belief that blatantly contradicts a firm conviction of ours. It survives for a brief moment (as the X section is

⁶ I am not saying that hallucinatory experiences must seem to be pure presentations that have no "amodal" components. If that were the case, hallucinated objects would seem to be mere facades, with no unperceived rear sides etc. Then hallucinations would be too easily told apart from genuine perceptions. I accept that when one hallucinates a material object one may experience it as having sides that are not perceived, but rather represented in an "amodal" fashion. The point remains, however, that I do not hallucinate x unless it seems to me that I perceive x. The fact that, as a rule, it cannot seem to me as though I perceive x unless some parts of x are amodally represented does not threaten that point. (Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for raising this issue.)

covered), and then evaporates as we remove the occluding pencil or finger. Weirder still, the Purist must maintain that as we cover the X bit, there that unruly belief is again. How it can get a second, third, indeed n^{th} lease of life is utterly mysterious, given our firm conviction that this is no ordinary triangle.

Secondly, we must not underestimate the degree of irrationality this saddles us with. To believe that Fig. 5 is a normal triangle is not merely to believe something you also believe happens to be false. It is to believe something you firmly believe is nomologically *impossible*. What was clearly *not* a triangle, printed on a sheet of perfectly normal paper, cannot all by itself a moment later turn into a normal triangle, then go back to the irregular figure it was and so on. It is impossible.

Thirdly, Bence Nanay (2010, p. 244) gives an additional, powerful reason to reject the doxastic strategy. Consider how the doxastic strategy proposes to deal with a case like Michotte’s “triangle”: we tend to believe it is normal (when partly occluded), because what we now see interacts with some background beliefs in such a way as to make us infer its normality.

But now consider Fig. 6. Here you amodally complete an *irregular shape*, with which you presumably have little prior experience. And you do so despite the fact that what the image as a whole seems to suggest is that the middle figure is a regular octagon like the others. Indeed, you experience the irregular shape *even* if your background beliefs include the *knowledge* – as mine do, since I have made the drawing myself – that the figure in the middle is just another regular octagon. As Nanay comments: “Even if a belief could at least sometimes be insensitive to some of our other beliefs, it certainly cannot be insensitive to those of our beliefs it is supposed to be inferred from” (Nanay, 2010, p. 244).




Fig. 6. Non-rational amodal completion of an irregular shape. After Kanisza (1985).

Thus, the doxastic strategy fails to convince.⁷ That leaves the option Nanay himself favours: the amodally completed bits are represented by visual *imagery*. Although Nanay does not offer this account in an attempt to defend The Pure View of perception, there is no reason why a Purist should not put the account to work for their own purposes, in particular if the other strategies seem unlikely to succeed.

⁷ There are variants of the doxastic strategy that these critical remarks do not directly affect. For example, one might appeal to doxastic states other than fully-fledged beliefs – perhaps what Tamar Gendler calls “aliefs”, or what Steven Stich had dubbed “subdoxastic states”. Purists could also invoke *phenomenal* beliefs – beliefs about how things seem or look (Brewer, 2011, pp. 136-137; Fish, 2009, p. 175; see also Glüer, 2009). Even if you are firmly convinced that Fig. 6 contains three identical regular octagons, you also believe that it *looks as though* the middle octagon is an irregular figure. It would take me too far afield to consider these and other mutations of the doxastic strategy. But see Overgaard (2021a) for some critical remarks on the appeal to phenomenal beliefs.

However, I think there is a serious problem with the imagery account, and it parallels our decisive objection to the hallucinatory strategy.⁸ For imagery is best understood as *quasi-perceptual*. To visualize a sunset is to imagine *seeing* a sunset, to call forth an “experience” of beautiful red and yellow colors, and so on. Nanay himself insists on this (2010, p. 252). Indeed, he emphasizes that it follows from the quasi-perceptual character of imagery that amodal completion is itself, in some sense, quasi-perceptual. As he says,

if what it is like to have visual imagery is similar to what it is like to perceive, and being aware of occluded parts is having visual imagery, then, putting these two claims together, we get that what it is like to be aware of the occluded parts of perceived objects is similar to what it is like to perceive those parts that are not occluded. (Nanay, 2010, p. 252)

The argument is logically impeccable:

- (1) Visual imagery is similar to perceiving non-occluded (parts of) things.
- (2) Being aware of occluded parts is having visual imagery.
- (3) Therefore, being aware of occluded parts is similar to perceiving non-occluded (parts of) things.

However, the conclusion is false. Being aware of occluded parts is precisely *not* like seeing non-occluded parts. It does not seem at all to you as though the hidden bits of the middle figure in Fig. 6 are given or presented to you in anything remotely like the way in which you see the non-occluded bits of the figure. The occluded bits seem to be *hidden*; they precisely do not seem to be *seen*. Since I agree with Nanay that (1) is indisputable, it is obviously (2) that has to go. Thus, the imagery strategy fails.

I conclude that none of the three strategies yields a plausible account of amodal completion. And that suggests that amodal completion is genuinely perceptual.⁹

5. Concluding Remarks

I want to end by briefly considering an objection to the argument I have presented. It may seem puzzling how I can say that amodal completion is genuinely perceptual, given the objections I have raised against the hallucinatory and imagery strategies. For in arguing against these, I emphasized that amodal completion was *not* like perceiving. But then how can I maintain that amodal completion is perceptual?

This only looks like an inconsistency to the extent that we are still in the grips of The Pure View. For Purists, visual perceptual experience is precisely pure seeing, pure presentation, pure givenness. To abandon The Pure View is to maintain that (some) perceptual experiences have commitments that go beyond what is given or presented – that go beyond what is *seen*. And there really is no tension between thinking that it is *perceptual experience* itself that “goes beyond” the given, and maintaining that the “beyond” in question neither is, nor in any way

⁸ Briscoe (2011) forcefully presses this objection against the imagery account.

⁹ There are some recent empirical studies on amodal completion of an object’s volume that point in the same direction. In Ekroll *et al.* (2013), a semi-spherical shell lying flat on a table looked exactly like that – like half a sphere. However, when lifted or tilted, the semi-spherical object would look like an intact sphere. In an interesting subsequent experiment, Ekroll *et al.* (2016) had subjects balance the hollow shell on the tip of their finger. This resulted in the shell (again) looking like a complete sphere. Moreover, apparently in order to “make room” for the complete sphere, subjects additionally experienced their fingers as shortened. For Ekroll and colleagues, these experimental data testify to the perceptual nature of amodal completion. (Consider the bizarre set of contradictory beliefs subjects in the 2016 study must have, if the data are to be explained doxastically. People believe both (i) that the semi-sphere is a semi-sphere, and (ii) that it is a complete sphere. In addition, they believe that (iii) their finger retains its normal size and (iv) that it is shorter than normal.)

seems to be, seen. Rather, to affirm both of those things is simply to affirm the impurity of at least some perceptual experiences.

Go back to the inconsistent triad with which I began:

- (1) Perception occurs.
- (2) Perception is the pure presentation of objects, property instances, events (etc.) in the world.
- (3) There is no pure presentation of objects, property instances, events (etc.) in the world.

Since (1) is indisputable – *pace* Derrida, or Derrida* – the question is whether to abandon (2) or (3). Husserl embraces (3) and rejects (2). For Husserl, perception is impure across the board. But nothing I have said supports (3), at least not directly. For all I have said, there could be cases of ‘pure presentation’. I take no stand on this matter. In lieu of (3), I submit:

- (4) *Some* cases of perception – cases involving amodal completion – are *impure* presentations of objects (etc.) in the world.

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