
THREE PARADIGMS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF THE TRUE: APOPHANTIC TRUTH, EIDOLOGICAL TRUTH, IDIOLOGICAL TRUTH¹

abstract

The investigation of concept of “true” and “false” has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate ‘true’ pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth.

keywords

truth; de dicto truth; apophantic truth; de re truth; eidological truth; idiological truth; philosophy of truth

¹ The present paper is the English translation made by Paolo Di Lucia and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel of the first chapter (*Tre paradigmi per una filosofia del vero: verità apofantica, verità eidologica, verità idiologica*) of Amedeo G. Conte, *Adelaster. il nome del vero*. Milano, LED, 2016 (pp. 21-37). The editors of this special issue are grateful to Adelheid Conte and to LED (Edizioni di Lettere, Economia e Diritto), in the person of Valeria Passerini, for the authorization to publish this translation.

Ἄπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφω.

It is simple the discourse of truth.

Euripide [Εὐριπίδης] [Salamina Σαλαμῖνα, 480 B.C.E. – Pella Πέλλα, 406 B.C.E.]

Simplex sigillum veri.

Ludwig Wittgenstein [Wien, 1889 – Cambridge (Great Britain), 1951]

“Alle Wahrheit ist einfach”. –

Ist das nicht zwiefach eine Lüge?

“All truth is simple”. –

Is this not a double lie?

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche [Röcken, 1844 – Weimar, 1900]

0. De Dicto Truth vs. De Re Truth

0.1. Question: *Of What
Entities the Adjective
'True' Is Predicated?*

The question is ancient:

Τί ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια;

*Quid est veritas?*¹

I will not reiterate the ancient question asked by Pontius Pilate; I will not enquire, with Martin Heidegger,² into the *Wesen der Wahrheit*, into the essence [*Wesen*] of truth. Instead of the

1 It is not inconvenient here to remind that not every word [verbum] is a name [nomen]: “*Non omne verbum nomen est*” (Augustine of Hippo [Aurelius Augustine from Tagaste, 354-430]).

2 According to a hypothesis documented in Martin Heidegger [1889-1976]:

(i) the initial *alpha* of ἀλήθεια [alétheia] is an *alpha privativum* (in Greek: α στερητικόν [here are four examples of Italian Grecisms with an *alpha privativum*: ‘acéfalo’ “acephalus, without head”; ‘anomía’ “anomy, absence of norms”; ‘acrisia’ “lack of critical sense”; ‘adeontico’ “adeontic, non-deontic”]);

(ii) correspondingly, ἀλήθεια [alétheia] means “non-latency”, “illatency”, “non-concealment”.

The hypothesis of *alpha privativum* is a legitimate hypothesis. However, it is not *in abstracto* illegitimate the alternative hypothesis that I have formulated of *alpha intensivum*: the initial *alpha* of ἀλήθεια [alétheia]:

(i) is not an *alpha privativum* (in Greek: α στερητικόν) but rather an *alpha intensivum* (in Greek: α ἐπιτατικόν [an example of *alpha intensivum* is the initial *alpha* of the adjective ‘ἀτενής’ [atenés]: ‘ἀτενής’ [atenés] does not mean “not-tense”, but “very tense”, “intense”);

(ii) correspondingly, ἀλήθεια [alétheia] means “high latency”, “supreme latency”, “maximum of latency”.

ancient question:

Quid est veritas?

I will ask a new question:

Of what entities the adjective 'true' is predicated?
(What are the entities of which 'true' is predicated?)

Here is my answer. The adjective 'true' is predicated of heterogeneous, categorically different entities: 'true' is predicated

- (i) not only (and specifically) of *dicta*, of *linguistic* entities, of *sentences*,
- (ii) but also (generically) of *any* entity, be it a *linguistic* or a *non-linguistic* entity.

0.2. Answer
to the Question:
*The Adjective 'True'
Is Predicated Both
De Dicto and De Re*

Two examples:

- (i) 'true' is predicated of a *dictum* (of a *linguistic* entity, of a sentence [*enunciato*, *Satz*, *énoncé*, *zdanie*]) when one asserts that the sentence 'Snow is white' is *true* (that it is a *true* sentence);
- (ii) 'true' is predicated of a *non-linguistic* entity (and more precisely of a number) when one asserts that $\sqrt{2}$ is not a *true* number.

To put it differently: 'true' can be predicated

- (i) both, *in specie*, of a *dictum* (of a sentence [*enunciato*, *Satz*, *énoncé*, *zdanie*]),³
- (ii) and, *in genere*, of a *res*.

Here is my terminological proposal.

- (i) For 'true' as a predicate of a *dictum* I suggested the term '*de dicto true*'.⁴
- (ii) For 'true' as a predicate of a *res* I suggested the term '*de re true*'.⁵

Accordingly:

- (i) for the truth that is predicated of a *dictum* I suggested the term '*de dicto truth*';⁶
- (ii) for the truth that is predicated of a *res* I suggested the term '*de re truth*'.

The *first* part (§ 1.) of this essay (*Three Paradigms for a Philosophy of the True*) is devoted to *de dicto* truth; the *second* part (§ 2.) is devoted to *de re* truth.

³ The nominative plural of the Latin neutral noun '*dictum*' is '*dicta*'; the ablative singular is '*dicto*'.

⁴ '*Dicto*' is the singular ablative of '*dictum*'. (The Latin preposition '*de*' takes the ablative: see, for instance, the three following titles: *De bello gallico* [Gaius Julius Caesar], *De senectute* [Marcus Tullius Cicero; Norberto Bobbio], *De scacchorum ludo* [Marcus Hyeronimus Vida].)

⁵ '*Re*' is the ablative singular (taken by the preposition '*de*') of '*res*'.

⁶ A possible alternative to '*de dicto true*' is '*logologically-true*' ('*logologisch-wahr*'). Correspondingly, a possible alternative to '*de dicto truth*' is '*logological truth*' ('*logologischs Wahrheit*'). This is a terminological alternative (an alternative terminology) that I immediately abandoned and will not use in the present paper.

**1. De Dicto Truth
(Apophantic Truth)**

1.0. Introduction The present § 1. is devoted to *de dicto* truth.

1.1. The Concept
of De Dicto Truth
(Apophantic Truth)

‘*De dicto* true’ is a predicate which is *specific* of a *dictum* (of a λεκτόν *lektón*). *De dicto* truth is the truth that is specific of *dicta* (of λεκτά *lektá*): more precisely, of sentences [*enunciati*, *Sätze*, *énoncés*, *zдания*].

A sentence [*enunciato*, *Satz*, *énoncé*, *zдание*] is *de dicto* true if, and only if, it is in a correspondence-relation with the state-of-affairs [*stato-di-cose*, *Sachverhalt*, *état-de-choses*, *stan rzeczy*] it is about.

The *de dicto* truth [in Italian: ‘*verità de dicto*’; in German: ‘*Wahrheit de dicto*’; in French: ‘*vérité de dicto*’; in Polish: ‘*prawda de dicto*’] of a sentence [*enunciato*, *Satz*, *énoncé*, *zдание*] consists in the correspondence with the state-of-affairs [*stato-di-cose*, *Sachverhalt*, *état-de-choses*, *stan rzeczy*] the sentence is about.⁸

1.2. Three Examples of
De Dicto Truth

The adjective ‘true’ means “*de dicto* true” in the three following examples:

- (i) “The mathematical sentence ‘3 is a prime number’ is a *true* sentence”.
- (ii) “The chromatic sentence ‘Snow is white’ is *true* if, and only if, snow is white”.
- (iii) “The heliocentric theory is *true*”.

1.3. An Anomalous
Phenomenon: Thetic
De Dicto Truth

A provocative, paradoxical case of *de dicto* truth is the case of *thetic de dicto* truth. I dub *thetic* truth [*verità thetica*, *thetische Wahrheit*, *vérité thétique*, *prawda tetyczna*] the truth (the *de dicto* truth) of a sentence that is produced by the *thetic* utterance [*enunciazione thetica*, *thetische Äußerung*, *énonciation thétique*, *wypowiedź tetyczna*] of that sentence. Four examples of *thetic* truth: the truth of the four following sentences

- (i) “Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος”
“*Tu es Petrus*”;⁹
- (ii) “*La difesa della patria è sacro dovere del cittadino*”
“The defense of the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen”¹⁰;
- (iii) “*Stolica Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej iest Warszawa*”
“Warsaw shall be the capital of the Republic of Poland”;¹¹
- (iv) ‘Given a line and a point outside it there is exactly one line through the given point which lies in the plane of the given line and point so that the two lines do not meet’.

1.4. The Twofold
Connection Between
De Dicto Truth
and the Linguistic
Nature of an Entity in
Bertrand Russell

The thesis according to which ‘true’ is a predicate specific to linguistic entities is documented in the two following passages by Bertrand Russell [Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell: Trellech, 1872 - Penrhyndeudraeth, 1970]:

⁷ The noun ‘*Sachverhalt*’ has become established in philosophical lexicon despite the harsh critique addressed to it by Arthur Schopenhauer [Danzig/Gdańsk, 1788 – Frankfurt am Main, 1860] in *Parerga und Paralipomena*, 1851.

⁸ The German feminine noun ‘*Sache*’ “thing”, “*res*”, fortuitously assonates both with

(i) ‘*Sprache*’, “language”, “*linguaggio*”, “*langage*”,

(ii) and ‘*Satz*’, “sentence”, “*enunciato*”, “*énoncé*”.

This fortuitous assonance, devoid of philosophical significance, has inspired me two German names of the *de dicto* truth:

(i) ‘*Sprachwahrheit*’,

(ii) ‘*Satzwahrheit*’.

⁹ Matthaëus [Κατὰ Μαθθαῖον. *Gospel of Matthew*], 16:16.

¹⁰ *Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana*, art. 52.

¹¹ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, art. 29

- (i) “A proposition is anything that is true or that is false”.¹²
- (ii) “We mean by ‘proposition’ primarily a form of words which expresses what is either true or false”.

As can be seen, in Russell the connection between *de dicto* truth and the linguistic nature of an entity is twofold:

- (i) *de dicto* truth is a predicate of linguistic entities (of “forms of words”),
- (ii) the possibility of *de dicto* truth (the possibility in which the Aristotelian apophantic nature of an entity consists) is constitutive of the very concept of *proposition*.

The foregoing § 1. was devoted to *de dicto* truth; the present § 2. is devoted to *de re* truth.

In contemporary analytic philosophy, *de dicto* truth is privileged: ‘true’ is mainly investigated as a predicate of *sentences* [*enunciati, Sätze, énoncés, zdania*]. However, it is false that ‘true’ *exclusively* means “*de dicto* true”; it is false that ‘true’ *exclusively* befits *dicta*, sentences.

On the contrary: the adjective ‘true’ has also other meanings: other meanings according to which it can be predicated of entities that are *not* sentences [*enunciati, Sätze, énoncés, zdania*]. It is the phenomenon of *de re* truth (*Sachwahrheit*).

The term ‘true’ means “*de re* true” in the eight following examples:

- (i) ‘An unfalsifiable theory is not a *true* theory’.¹³
- (ii) ‘An uncontradictable theory is not a *true* theory’.¹⁴
- (iii) ‘According to Rudolf Carnap, metaphysical problems are not *true* problems: they are merely *Scheinprobleme* [apparent problems, pseudo-problems]’.¹⁵
- (iv) ‘A question that in principle does not admit an answer is not a *true* question’.
- (v) ‘A rhetorical question is not a *true* question’.
- (vi) ‘Only fulfillable obligations are *true* obligations’.
- (vii) ‘A testimony given for oneself is not a *true* testimony’.¹⁶
- (viii) ‘An invalid norm is not a *true* norm’.¹⁷

2. De Re Truth

2.0. Introduction

2.1. De Re Truth: The Generic Concept [Gattungsbegriff]

2.1.1. Eight Examples of De Re Truth

12 As cited in Lorini (2003, p. XV).

13 Thesis maintained by Karl Raimund Popper.

14 Thesis maintained by Amedeo Giovanni Conte.

15 See the juxtaposition: ‘*sein*’ “to be” vs. ‘*Schein*’ “appearance”. The word game (‘*sein*’ ‘*Schein*’) that exists in German can be rendered in other languages: in particular,

(i) in Dutch (where the verb ‘*zijn*’ “to be” rhymes with the noun ‘*schijn*’ “appearance”);

(ii) in French (where the verb ‘*être*’ “to be” rhymes with the verb ‘*paraître*’ “to appear”);

(iii) in Castilian (where the verb ‘*ser*’ “to be” rhymes with the verb ‘*parecer*’ “to appear”).

The word game ‘*sein*’ ‘*Schein*’, ‘*zijn*’ ‘*schijn*’, ‘*être*’ ‘*paraître*’, ‘*ser*’ ‘*parecer*’ cannot be rendered in Italian (where ‘*essere*’ “to be” does not rhyme with ‘*apparire*’ “to appear”), nor in a language akin to Castilian: Catalan (where neither ‘*ésser*’ nor ‘*ser*’ “to be” rhyme with ‘*aparèixer*’ “to appear”).

16 Johannes, 5:31; Johannes, 8:13.

17 In the following ingenious example (on the *enchère* [in English: bid]), formulated by Jean-Louis Gardies [1926-2004], the adjective ‘*fausse*’ (feminine of ‘*faux*’) occurs twice: in the *first* occurrence as *de re*; in the *second* as *de dicto*: “*Une fausse enchère serait aussi une enchère fausse*”. Analogously A.L. Machado Neto [1930-1977] writes: “*Sô a norma verdadeira é verdadeira norma*”.

2.1.2. Three
Anomalous
Phenomena: The
Truth of *Norms*, the
Truth of *Questions*,
the Truth of *Names*
2.1.2.0. Introduction

I said that the adjective ‘true’ means not only “*de dicto* true”, but also “*de re* true”. In particular: ‘*de re* true’ can be predicated of non-apophantic, anapophantic,¹⁸ semiotic entities (norms, questions, names), that is, semiotic entities which have the privative [στερητικός] character of being non-apophantic (anapophantic) in common.

2.1.2.1. First
Anomalous
Phenomenon:
The Truth
of *Norms*

2.1.2.1.1. Firstly, it is ‘*de re* true’ that can be predicated of *norms* [*norme, Normen, norms, normy*], that is, anapophantic semiotic entities, i.e., semiotic entities of which ‘*de dicto* true’ cannot be predicated.

Four examples:

- (i) ‘An invalid norm is not a *true* norm’.
- (ii) ‘An unjust norm is not a *true* norm’.
- (iii) ‘An inefficacious norm is not a *true* norm’.
- (iv) ‘Unwritten customs are *very* laws’.¹⁹

2.1.2.1.2. The four aforementioned theses in terms of ‘*de re* true’ [‘*eidologisch-wahr*’] (‘An invalid norm is not a *true* norm’; ‘An unjust norm is not a *true* norm’; ‘An inefficacious norm is not a *true* norm’; ‘Unwritten customs are *very* laws’) are respectively documented in Hans Kelsen, Maximilien de Robespierre, Novalis, Thomas Hobbes.

- (i) “*Eine nicht-geltende Norm ist keine Norm*”.
“A *non-valid* norm is not a *norm* [*ist keine Norm*]”. (Hans Kelsen)
- (ii) “*Toute loi qui viole les droits imprescriptibles de l’homme, est essentiellement injuste et tyrannique; elle n’est point une loi*”.
“Every law that violates the imprescriptible rights of man is essentially *unjust* and tyrannical: it is not a *law* [*n’est point une loi*]”. (Maximilien de Robespierre)
- (iii) “*Ein Gesetz ist seinem Begriffe nach, wirksam. Ein unwirksames Gesetz ist kein Gesetz*”.
“A law is effective [*wirksam*] by virtue of its own *eidos* [εἶδος] (by virtue of the *eidos* [εἶδος] of a law) [*seinem Begriffe nach*]. An *ineffective* law [*ein unwirksames Gesetz*] is not a *law* [*ist kein Gesetz*]”. (Novalis [Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg])
- (iv) “*Unwritten customs are very laws*”. (Thomas Hobbes)

2.1.2.2 Second
Anomalous
Phenomenon:
The Truth
of *Questions*

Secondly, it is ‘*de re* true’ that can be predicated of *questions* [*demande, Fragen, questions, pytania*]. (Questions, just like norms, are semiotic entities of which ‘*de dicto* true’ cannot be predicated.)

Two examples:

¹⁸ *Apophantic* entities are semiotic entities of which the true and the false *can* be predicated. *Non-apophantic* (*anapophantic*) entities are entities of which the true and the false *cannot* be predicated. The adjective ‘apophantic’ [ἀποφαντικός] belongs to the philosophical lexicon of Aristotle of Stagira [384-322 B.C.E.]. Apophantic discourse [λόγος ἀποφαντικός] is a species of the meaningful discourse, of semantic discourse [λόγος σημαντικός]: in particular, it is ἀποφαντικός the discourse [λόγος] that is capable of being true or non-true. Not all meaningful discourses [not all λόγοι σημαντικοί] are apophantic [ἀποφαντικοί]: according to Aristotle, for instance, the εὐχή *euché* [the prayer] is λόγος σημαντικός (meaningful discourse), but not λόγος ἀποφαντικός (discourse capable of being true or non-true).

¹⁹ The English adjective ‘very’ is here understood as a synonym of ‘true’. (Translator’s note)

- (i) ‘A question that in principle admits of no answer is not a *true* question’.
- (ii) ‘A rhetorical question [*domanda retorica, rhetorische Frage, question rhétorique, pytanie retoryczne*] is not a *true* question’.

Thirdly, it is ‘*de re true*’ that can be predicated of names [*nomi, Namen, noms, nazwy*].

Four examples:

- (i) ‘Novalis’ *true* name is ‘Georg Friedrich Philipp (*vel* Leopold) Freiherr von Hardenberg’.
- (ii) ‘Mozart’s *true* second name is not ‘Amadeus’, it is ‘Gottlieb’.²⁰
- (iii) ‘Tarski’s *true* surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’.
- (iv) ‘All Adelasters are provisional names, to be abandoned as soon as the *true* names of the plants so called can be ascertained’.²¹

2.1.2.3. *Third Anomalous Phenomenon: The Truth of Names*

Paradoxically, ‘true’ can be predicated of the truth [*verità, Wahrheit, vérité, prawda*] itself. Three examples, in three different languages: English, German, Arabic. In these examples ‘true’ <or its synonym ‘very’> with the meaning of “*de re true*” is predicated of the truth itself (“very truth”, “true truth”).

2.1.3. A Paradoxical Phenomenon: The Truth of the Truth

- (i) ‘True’ is predicated of *truth* in an *English*-speaking author: Nathaniel Hawthorne. In Hawthorne appears the expression: ‘the very truth’.
- (ii) ‘True’ is predicated of *truth* [*Wharheit*] in a *German*-speaking author: Friedrich Hölderlin. In Hölderlin appears the expression: ‘*die wahrste Wahrheit*’, ‘the truest truth’.
- (iii) ‘True’ is predicated of *truth* [*haqq*] in a *Jewish Arab*-speaking author: Ya’qūb [Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb al-Qirqisānī. In Ya’qūb al-Qirqisānī appears the expression: ‘*haqq haqīqī*’, ‘true truth’.²²

After these three documents (‘the very truth’, ‘*die wahrste Wahrheit*’, ‘*haqq haqīqī*’), in which ‘*de re true*’ is predicated of truth, here is a fourth document (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche) in which of truth it is predicated not ‘true’ (‘*de re true*’) but ‘false’ [‘*falsch*’].²³

“*Verloren sei uns der Tag, wo nicht ein Mal getanzt wurde!*
Und falsch heiÙe jede Wahrheit, bei der es nicht ein Gelächter gab!”
 “We should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once.
 And we should call every *truth* [*Wahrheit*] *false* [*falsch*] which was not accompanied by at least one laugh!”

20 ‘Gottlieb’ is not equivalent to ‘Amadeus’: the morpheme ‘*lieb*’ which appears in ‘*Gottlieb*’ (i) is not the homonymous morpheme which appears in the German adjective ‘*lieb*’ ‘dear’, in the German noun ‘*Liebe*’ ‘love’, in the German verb ‘*lieben*’ ‘to love’, (ii) but is a morpheme etymologically akin to the Greek ‘*λείπω*’ ‘*leípō*’ ‘to leave’, to the Latin ‘*linquo*’ ‘to leave’, to the English ‘to leave’. Some variants of this second morpheme appear in the very German name ‘Detlev’, in the German arithmonyms ‘*elf*’ ‘eleven’ and ‘*zwölf*’ ‘twelve’, as well as in the English arithmonyms ‘eleven’ and ‘twelve’.

21 Two English botanists speak of “*true* names”: John Lindley [1799-1865] and Thomas Moore [1779-1852]. Lindley and Moore coined the English name ‘*adelaster*’ as a provisional name for a plant whose “*true* name” is unknown.

22 Ya’qūb [Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb] al-Qirqisānī (Arabic-speaking Jewish author), *Kitāb al-anwār*, IV, 33, 7. Cited by Bruno Chiesa (2000, p. 173).

23 ‘False truth’ is a evocative *oxymoron*, just as it is an *oxymoron* the title of an American movie: ‘True Lies’.

- 2.2. De Re Truth: Two Species
(Eidological Truth, Idiologological Truth)
- In the course of my research, I have distinguished two species of *de re* truth:
- (i) *eidological* truth [*verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, vérité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna*];
 - (ii) *idiologological* truth [*verità idiologica, idiologische Wahrheit, vérité idiologique, prawda idiologiczna*].

To the *first* species of *de re* truth, *eidological* truth, is devoted § 2.2.1.; to the *second* species of *de re* truth, *idiologological* truth, is devoted § 2.2.2.

2.2.1. The First Species of De Re Truth: Eidological De Re Truth

- 2.2.1.1. The Concept of Eidological Truth
- In § 1.1. I have introduced the concept of *de dicto* truth. I now turn to the concept of *eidological* truth [*verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, vérité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna*]. ‘*Eidologically-true*’ [‘*eidologisch-wahr*’] (unlike ‘*de dicto true*’, see § 1.) is *not* specifically predicated of *sentences*: it generically applies to any entity.
Definition of *eidological* truth: An entity *x* is an *eidologically-true y* if, and only if, *x* corresponds to the *eidos* [εἶδος] of *y*.

2.2.1.2 Seven Examples of Eidological Truth

- The term ‘true’ <or its synonym ‘very’> means “*eidologically-true*” in the following seven examples:
- (i) ‘A theory that cannot be falsified is not a *true* theory.’²⁴
 - (ii) ‘A theory that cannot be contradicted is not a *true* theory.’
 - (iii) ‘Astrology (unlike astronomy) is not a *true* science (it is a *false* science).’²⁵
 - (iv) ‘White is not a *true* colour.’
 - (v) ‘Irrational numbers are not *true* numbers.’
 - (vi) ‘Unwritten customs are *very* laws.’²⁶
 - (vii) ‘*Nur das ist die wahrste Wahrheit, in der auch der Irrtum zur Wahrheit wird.*’²⁷
‘Only that is the *truest* truth [*die wahrste Wahrheit*], in which even error becomes truth [*Wahrheit*].’

2.2.1.3. Relationship Between Eidological Truth and De Dicto Truth (Apophantic Truth)

- I now raise a question: What is the relationship between *eidologically-true* and *de dicto true*? (What is the relationship between *eidological* truth and *de dicto* truth?)
I answer the question. Like *de dicto* truth, also *eidological* truth (§ 2.1.) is *correspondence, Entsprechung*.

²⁴ Remark:

(i) ‘a *true* theory’ (“an *eidologically-true* theory”, “a real and proper theory”, “*una vera teoria*”, “*une véritable théorie*”) is not equal to

(ii) ‘a theory that is *true*’ (“a *de dicto true* theory”, “*una teoria vera*”, “*une théorie vraie*”).

In ancient Greek,

(i) the adjective for *de dicto true* is ‘ἀληθής’;

(ii) the adjective for *eidologically-true* is ‘ἀληθινός’. For example, in the *Symbolum nicaenum* the adjective which occurs (twice) in the passage in which it is predicated of Jesus Christ: “*true* God from *true* God” is ‘ἀληθινός’.

²⁵ Astrology is not a *true* science (it is a *false* science) in the sense that it does not correspond to the *eidos* [εἶδος] of a science.

²⁶ Thomas Hobbes.

²⁷ Friedrich Hölderlin.

The difference between *de dicto* truth and *eidological* truth lies in the point of reference of the correspondence relation:

- (i) *de dicto* truth is *correspondence* of a sentence [*enunciato, Satz, énoncé, zdanie*] to a state-of-affairs [*stato-di-cose, Sachverhalt, état-de-choses, stan rzeczy*]; and precisely, correspondence of a sentence to the state-of-affairs on which that sentence relates;
- (ii) *eidological* truth is *correspondence* of an entity to an *eîdos* [εἶδος]: an *x* is an *eidologically-true y* if, and only if, *x* corresponds to the *eîdos* [εἶδος] of *y*. (An example: A member of the teaching staff of a University is an *eidologically-true* university professor if, and only if, he corresponds to the *eîdos* [εἶδος] of the university professor.)

The distinction between *de dicto* truth and *eidological* truth has been introduced in Amedeo Giovanni Conte, *Deontica aristotelica* (1992), through a simple juxtaposition.

- (i) On the one hand, when one says: ‘The etymologies made by Plato in the dialogue *Cratylus* are not *true* etymologies’ one denies that those Platonic etymologies correspond to the *eîdos* [εἶδος] of etymology: one therefore denies their *eidological* truth.
- (ii) On the other hand, when one says: ‘The etymology of *étymos* [ἔτυμος] documented in Johann Baptist Hofmann is not *true*’, one denies the correspondence of that etymology to reality: one, therefore, denies its *de dicto* truth.

In both examples the adjective ‘true’ is referred to the substantive ‘etymology’. However, the adjective ‘true’ has not the same meaning in the two sentences:

- (i) in the *first* of the two examples (in the example of the etymologies made by Plato in the *Cratylus*: ‘The etymologies made by Plato in the dialogue *Cratylus* are not *true* etymologies’), ‘true’ means “*eidologically-true*” [“*eidologisch-wahr*”];
- (ii) in the *second* of the two examples (in the example of the etymology of *étymos* [ἔτυμος] mentioned by Johann Baptist Hofmann: ‘The etymology of *étymos* [ἔτυμος] documented in Johann Baptist Hofmann is not *true*’), ‘true’ means “*de dicto* true”.

2.2.2. The Second Species of *De Re* Truth: *Idiological De Re* Truth

2.2.2.1. The concept of *idiological* truth

In § 1. I have dealt with the phenomenon of *de dicto* truth. In § 2.2.1. I have dealt with the *first* species of *de re* truth: *eidological* truth. In the present § 2.2.2. I will deal with the *second* species of *de re* truth: *idiological* truth [*verità idiologica, idiologische Wahrheit, vérité idiologique, prawda idiologiczna*].²⁸

The adjective ‘*idiological*’ [‘*idiologico*’, ‘*idiologisch*’, ‘*idiologique*’, ‘*idiologiczny*’] is derived from the Greek adjective ‘*idios*’ [ἴδιος] “one’s own”, “individual”, “personal”, “peculiar”.²⁹

²⁸ The adjectival phrase corresponding to ‘*idiological* truth’ is ‘*idologically-true*’.

²⁹ The misleading assonance of ‘*idiological*’ [‘*idiologico*’, ‘*idiologisch*’, ‘*idiologique*’, ‘*idiologiczny*’] (with ‘i’: from Greek ‘*idios*’ [ἴδιος]) with ‘*ideological*’ [‘*ideologico*’, ‘*ideologisch*’, ‘*idéologique*’, ‘*ideologiczny*’] (with ‘e’: from Greek ‘*idéa*’ [ἰδέα])

I define the concept of *idiological* truth: An entity *x* is the *idiologically-true* *z* if, and only if, it is in an identity-relation with *z*. In other terms: An entity *x* is the *idiologically-true* *z* if, and only if, ‘*x*’ (the name of *x*) has the same *Bedeutung* as ‘*z*’ (the name of ‘*z*’), that is, if, and only if, ‘*x*’ and ‘*z*’ designate (*bezeichnen*) *unum* and *idem*.³⁰

The difference between *eidological* truth and *idiological* truth can be formulated as follows:

- (i) *eidological* truth [*eidologische Wahrheit*] is correspondence of an entity to an *eidos* [εἶδος];
- (ii) *idiological* truth [*idiologische Wahrheit*] is identity to (identity with) an *ídion* [ἴδιον], to an individual entity.

2.2.2.2. Four Examples of Idiological Truth

Here are *four* examples of idiological truth.

- (i) ‘The *true* name of Novalis is ‘Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg’.’
- (ii) ‘Erik the Red³¹ is the *true* discoverer of America.’
- (iii) ‘The *true* cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer.’
- (iv) ‘Alfred Tarski’s *true* surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’.’

2.2.2.3. Exemplifying the Difference Between *Eidological* Truth and *Idiological* Truth

What is the relationship between the two species of *de re* truth (*eidological* truth and *idiological* truth)?

Eidological truth [*verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, verité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna*] consists in a *correspondence* relationship to an *eidos* [εἶδος]; *idiological* truth [*verità idiologica, idiologische Wahrheit, verité idiologique, prawda idiologiczna*] consists not in a relationship of correspondence, but rather in a relationship of *identity*.

I will clarify the difference between *eidological* truth and *idiological* truth by comparing the terms of the following two pairs of examples.

2.2.2.3.1. First Pair of Examples

‘Aristotle’s ‘*causa formalis*’ is not a *true* cause.’³²

vs.

‘The *true* cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer.’

In both sentences occurs the phrase ‘*true* cause’. But the adjective ‘*true*’ does not have the same meaning in the two sentences:

- (i) in the *first* of the two sentences (‘Aristotle’s ‘*causa formalis*’ is not a *true* cause’), ‘*true*’ has an *eidological* meaning (“*eidologically-true*” [“*eidologisch-wahr*”]);
- (ii) in the *second* of the two sentences (‘The *true* cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer’), ‘*true*’ has an *idiological* meaning (“*idiologically-true*” [“*idiologisch-wahr*”]);

is purely fortuitous. [The Italian translations for ‘*ídios*’ [ἴδιος] listed by Conte are: “*proprio*”, “*individuale*”, “*particolare*”. (Transaltors’ note)]

³⁰ I propose, for the identity of *Bedeutung* (in Gottlob Frege’s sense), a term parallel to ‘synonymity’ [‘*sinonimia*’, ‘*Synonymie*’, ‘*synonymie*’, ‘*synonimia*’]: the neologism ‘synsemy’ [‘*sinsemìa*’, ‘*Synsemie*’, ‘*synsémie*’, ‘*synsemia*’].

(i) ‘Synonymy’ is formed with ‘σύν’ [‘*sýn*’] and ‘ὄνυμα’ [‘*ónyma*’];

(ii) ‘synsemy’ is formed with ‘σύν’ [‘*sýn*’] and ‘σημαίνω’ [‘*sēmainō*’].

³¹ The Norse form of Erik the Red’s name is Eiríkr Rauði [ca 940 – ca 1007].

³² Here ‘*true*’ has an *eidological* meaning: in a strictly aitiological conception of the concept of cause (a conception in which the prototypical cause is the *causa efficiens*), the *true* causes of something are the *causa efficiens* and (perhaps) the *causa finalis*, but certainly not the *causa formalis*.

‘A surname consisting of a single letter is not a *true* surname.’³³

vs.

‘Alfred Tarski’s *true* surname is ‘Tajtelbaum.’

2.2.2.3.2. *Second Pair of Examples*

In both examples occurs the phrase ‘*true* surname’. But the adjective ‘true’ does not have the same meaning in the two examples:

- (i) in the *first* of the two sentences (‘A surname consisting of only one letter is not a *true* surname.’), ‘true’ means “*eidologically-true*” meaning [“*eidologisch-wahr*”];
- (ii) in the *second* of the two sentences (‘Alfred Tarski’s *true* surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’’), ‘true’ means *idiologically-true* [*idiologisch-wahr*];

The difference between *eidological* truth (§ 2.2.1.) and *idiological* truth (§ 2.2.2.) explains why there is *no* inconsistency in the following example (concerning the history of geographical explorations):

2.2.2.4. *Testing My Differentiation of the Concepts of Eidological Truth and Idiological Truth*

‘Erik the Red [Eiríkr Rauði] is the *true* discoverer of America, but his discovery was not a *true* discovery; instead, a *true* discovery is the one made by Christopher Columbus’.

There is no inconsistency, because in this example ‘true’ (that occurs three times) has *two* meanings: in particular:

- (i) ‘true’ means “*idiologically-true*” in the *first* of the three occurrences;
- (ii) ‘true’ means “*eidologically-true*” in the *second* and the *third* occurrences.

³³ That a surname consisting of a single letter is not a *true* surname is the objection raised some years ago by an American bank to a (would-be) client of Asian origin, whose surname consisted precisely of a single letter.

(i) A surname consisting of a single letter is the surname (‘X’) of a celebrated champion of the African-American’s rights: Malcom X.

(ii) It consists of a single letter the first component (‘U’) of the name of a Burmese UN Secretary: U Tant.

**3. Tres Vidi.
Unity and Trinity
in the Philosophy
of the True**

- 18:1 *The LORD* [Biblia hebraica: YHWH; Septuaginta: ὁ Θεός; Vulgata: Dominus] appeared to Abraham by the oak of Mamre [...].
- 18:2 Looking up, he saw *three men* [Biblia hebraica: š'lošāh "nāšīm; Septuaginta: τρεῖς ἄνδρες; Vulgata: tres viri] standing near him. [...]
- 18:3 [h]e ran to greet *them*; and [...] he said: "Sir [Biblia hebraica: Ādōnāi; Septuaginta: Κύριε; Vulgata: Domine], if it please you, do not go on past [non passar oltre] your [il tuo] servant.
- 18:4 "Let [Lasciate] some water be brought, that you may bathe your [lavatevi] feet, and then rest [riposatevi] [...]."
- 18:5 "Now that you have come [voi siete passati] to your [vostro] servant [...]; and afterward you may go on [continuerete] your [vostro] way."
- 18:9 "Where is your wife Sarah?" *they* [essi] asked him. "There in the tent," he replied.
- 18:10 *One* of them [E l'altro] said: "I will return to you about this time next year, and Sarah will then have a son."

Genesis³⁴

Tres vidi et unum adoravit.
Augustin of Hippo³⁵

3.1. *Tres vidi*. Three are the phenomena that I have seen (correlatively, three are the *species* concepts [congetti di specie] that I have distinguished within the *genus* concept [conchetto di genere, Gattungsbegriff]: truth):

- (i) first *species*: *de dicto* truth;
- (ii) second *species*: *eidological* truth;
- (iii) third *species*: *idiological* truth.

3.2. *Tres vidi*. But (I will say, exemplifying Augustine of Hippo, *De trinitate*, 2:4) *unum adoravi*: the concept of truth [verità, Wahrheit, vérité, prawda] in general, the concept of truth *tout court* (without any qualifications).

3.3. *Tres vidi*. But *one* is the truth. And *one* is the truth (the *de dicto* truth) of any discourse on truth ("Veritas veritatis non est adversa": Peter Abelard). *One* is the truth; but *triune* is the philosophy of the truth, a philosophy that is articulated into *three* philosophies:

- (i) the philosophy of *de dicto* truth;
- (ii) the philosophy of *eidological* truth;
- (iii) the philosophy of *idiological* truth.

The Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus [c. AD 57 – c. 120] writes:

Romanorum primus Cn. Pompeius Iudaeos domuit templumque iure victoriae ingressus est; inde volgatum nulla intus deum effigie vacuam sedem et inania arcana.

Cneius Pompeius was the first of our countrymen to subdue the Jews. Availing himself

34 *Vetus Testamentum. Liber Bresith id est Genesis*, 18:1-10. (I highlighted in *italics* the alternation of the singular and the plural.) [For the English text we made reference to *The New American Bible (Revised Edition)*. (Translator's note)]

35 Augustin of Hippo [Aurelius Augustinus], *De Trinitate*, 2:4.

of the right of conquest, he entered the temple. Thus, it became commonly known that the place stood empty with no similitude of gods within, and that the shrine had nothing to reveal.³⁶

The same holds for philosophical research. When the philosopher gets to the very heart of the problem, the heart of the problem appears empty to him, just as the shrine of the Temple of Jerusalem appeared empty to the Romans:³⁷

- (i) empty, as *still* is the eye of the hurricane;
- (ii) empty, as *desert of images* is the blind spot on the retina;³⁸
- (iii) empty, as *dark* is the heart of a flame.




Table 1.

Hexade of the Concepts of Truth and True.

Hexadic typology (through three successive dichotomies)
of the relationships between six concepts of truth [verità, wahrheit, vérité, prawda]

36 Publius Cornelius Tacitus, *Historiae*, 5.9. English translation in *Complete Works of Tacitus*, translated from the Latin by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb. New York: Random House, 1873, reprinted 1942. Edited for Perseus by Sara Bryant (<https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.02.0080>).

37 See Flavius Josephus [in Greek: Φλαύουλος Ἰώσηπος; in Latin: Titus Flavius Iosephus; in Hebrew: Joseph ben Matityahu ha-Cohen; Jerusalem (in Hebrew: Yerushalayim; in Arab: al-Quds), 37 AD – Rome, ca 100 AD], Ἱστορία Ἰουδαϊκοῦ πολέμου. *Historía ioudaikoῦ polémou* (in Latin: *De bello iudaico*). Of the innermost part of the sanctuary [ναός naós], Flavius Josephus writes: “Ἐκεῖτο δ’ οὐδέν ὅλως ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀβατον καὶ ἀχραντον καὶ ἀθέατον ἐν πάσιν, ἀγίου δὲ ἄγιον ἐκαλεῖτο”. “Ékeito d’oudèn hólōs en autói, ábaton kai áchranton ka athéaton en pásin, hagióu dè hágion ekaleíto”. “In this there was nothing at all. It was inaccessible, and inviolable, and not to be seen by any; and was called the *Holy of Holies*” (Flavius Josephus, 1737, book 5, Chapter 5, number 5).

38 Five xenonyms of ‘blind spot’: ‘punto cieco’, ‘blinder Fleck’, ‘point aveugle’, ‘tache aveugle’, ‘część ślepa siatkówki’. Four xenonyms of ‘retina’: ‘retina’, ‘Netzhaut’, ‘rétine’, ‘siatkówka’. See Conte, 2006.

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