

ANTÓNIO DE CASTRO CAEIRO

**THE SNUBNESS-STRUCTURE AND
THE INEXTRICABLE SOUL-BODY RELATIONSHIP**

Abstract

This paper is conceived in the footsteps of *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem* by David Charles, OUP 2021. It examines the intricate relationship between mind and body through the lens of Aristotle's 'Snubness-structure' ('S-structure') according to David Charles's interpretation in *The Undivided Self*. I explore how this conceptual framework, exemplified by the distinction between nasal concavity and geometric concavity, provides a comprehensive approach to understanding the inseparability of form and matter in natural phenomena. The study extends this analysis to various psychological faculties, including perception (*aisthēsis*), desire (*epithymia*), thought (*nous*) and emotions (*pathē*). By investigating the application of the S-structure across these domains, I aim to elucidate Aristotle's nuanced view of the mind-body relationship, challenging both reductionist and dualist interpretations. This research contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, offering insights into how ancient philosophical concepts can inform contemporary discussions on the nature of consciousness and embodied cognition.

Keywords

Snubness in Aristotle, Aristotle's *On Soul*, Mind-Body Relationship,
Hylomorphism, Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind

Author

António de Castro Caeiro
Universidade NOVA de Lisboa (NOVA FCSH) – IFILNOVA
cajc@fcsh.unl.pt

In a recent book (2021),¹ David Charles interprets the soul as essentially embodied (or somatized) and the body as essentially ensouled (psychic or mental): Aristotle’s psychophysicalism eliminates the mind-body problem since they are “inextricably intertwined”.²

David Charles formulates the mind-body problem in the following way:

T1. Charles (2021) p. 1:³

Our mind-body problem can be expressed, at first approximation, as follows: how can the physical, defined without any explicit reference in its definition to the psychological, give rise to the psychological with its distinctive features, where the psychological is defined (in part or in whole) without any explicit reference in its definition to the physical?

1. Various Strategies Attempt to Make the Connection

T2. Charles (2021) pp. 1-2:

(a) Reductionist materialism: “the psychological [...] can be fully explained in terms of the physical”.

(b) Non-reductionist materialism: “the psychological, so defined, ‘arises out’ of the physical but is not fully explicable in terms of it.” [...] “[p]sychological properties are not reducible to physical properties but rest on, or emerge out of, them”.

(c) Functionalism: “The psychological itself, phenomenal consciousness and rational commitments [...] all psychological phenomena can be unproblematically realized in physical events or states”.

(d) Pan-psychism or spiritualism: “the physical [...] or some parts of it, is redefined as alive with consciousness or proto-consciousness, primitively disposed to have conscious experience”.

(e) Neutral monism: “the physical and the psychological, defined as above, are each to be understood as emerging from a more basic type of stuff which is neither physical nor psychological but neutral between them”.

These interpretations put the emphasis on the mind or the body in a radical way. In a general ontology: form or matter, respectively. They all seem to

¹ Charles (2021). See also Charles (2023).

² This is how Corcilius (2023) p. 304 puts it. For critical reviewing, cf. Hahmann (2023); Shields (2023); Simpson (forthcoming).

³ The texts with the acronym T, followed by the corresponding numeral indicating the order of the cited occurrence, are from Aristotle and David Charles. It seemed to us that this way the reader can more easily follow the line of argumentation. As a rule, the translations used for Aristotle are by Hett (1957), Rackham (1926), Rackham (1935) and Cooke & Tredennick (1938). The passages translated by Charles are marked.

differ from Aristotle's attempt to understand beings in terms of a hylomorphic structure.⁴ This has the effect of failing to bear in mind that it is precisely the relationship between *psychē* and *sōma* that is essential. In other words, if *psychē* is the *eidos* of human beings and *sōma* is their *hylē*, then it is the inextricable relationship between the two that ought to be established and fixed at various points:

- 1) one referring to the other,
- 2) one not existing without the other,
- 3) one definitionally interdependent on the other.
- 4) The action of *psychē* is on extra-mental objects. Extra-mental objects: other people, other things, are understood through the inextricable reference to *psychē*.

2. *Enmattered Forms*

T3. Charles (2021) p. 6 n. 12:
Forms can be enmattered other than in bodies.

- 5) Forms can be 'embodied' and 'enmattered'.

Isolating *psychē*, abstracted from the body, does not abolish the structuring hylomorphic relation in explaining mental activity. Similarly, the isolation of material bodies, abstracted from mental intervention, does not remove either the hylomorphic structural relation in explaining them. Charles gives an alternative interpretation that there is an inextricable relationship between mind and body in Aristotle. According to this interpretation, phenomena are essentially psychophysical, psychosomatic or, to use another formulation, hylomorphic. "Emotions, desire, and perception are, in his view, inextricably psycho-physical." (Charles 2021, p. 6).

T4. Charles (2021) pp. 2-3:
He (*sc.* Aristotle) developed a way of thinking about psychological and physical phenomena which, once properly set out, dissolves the mind-body problem that these proposals are

⁴ Cohen (1992) pp. 5-22.

designed to address. [...] [I]n his view, [perception, desire, emotion] are inextricably psycho-physical activities whose essential properties are inextricably psycho-physical. [...] Neither can be adequately defined without reference to the other. [...] “The phenomena at issue cannot be defined by decomposition into two definitionally separable components, one purely psychological (defined without explicit reference to the physical), the other purely physical (defined without reference to the psychological).

What I want to do here is, first, to present Charles’s actual research program, the contemporary debate that has taken place and continues to do so, a truly *gigantomachia peri tēs ousias* about the mind-body relationship. I will then briefly present the lines of research in which it is possible to understand the thesis of the indivisibility of the self in action.

3. Aristotle’s Account

T5. Charles (2021) p. 5:

[A] The psychological activities involved in emotions, desire and perception (and their essential properties) are defined as inextricably psycho-physical, not definable by decomposition into two separately defined types of phenomena, one purely psychological, the other purely physical. Being psycho-physical is (in a way to be explicated) an essential aspect of their nature.

[B] The relevant specific type of physical activity cannot be defined without explicit reference in their definition to some psycho-physical activity. It too is an essentially psycho-physical activity, even though the relevant matter is not itself primitively endowed with consciousness.

Three fronts are being developed to solve the problem. These are 1) perception, 2) desire and emotion, 3) artifacts. First, in perception, the indivisibility of the relationship between perception and perceived must be attested, not as divisible but as inextricable.

4. Explaining Perception

T6. Charles (2021) p. 7:

We can grasp somewhat more precisely what is involved in Aristotle’s claim [A] by considering his discussion of snubness, which he defined, I shall suggest, as nasal concavity: a type of concavity which cannot be defined without essential reference to the nose. Snubness is not, in his view, a type of concavity, defined independently of noses, which is realized by or related (in some way) to noses. It is, instead, an essential (de re) aspect of the nature of the relevant type of concavity that it is nasal concavity. This type of concavity is, we might say,

or intrinsically, nasal. The form in question contains, in Aristotle's own terminology, being nasal 'as a part'. [...] Snubness is to be defined in ways which explicitly refer in its definition to a distinctively nasal way of being concave. It is because snubness is, in its nature, this specific type of concavity that it can only be realized in noses.

Aristotle's example is that of *simotēs* as a description of a type of nose shape other than concavity, a formal geometric description of a shape that does not necessarily apply to a nose but can describe, for example, bowls, certain types of legs, cavities and so on.

The sigma structure model is used to analyse emotions.⁵ Psychologically, anger is a desire for revenge. When we take a closer look at emotions, particularly to anger but also to fear and desire, we find the same inextricability *sōma psychē* or *hylē morphē* that we have found in snubness as a nose kind of concavity, or a concave kind of geometric pattern captured by perception. We find in Aristotle's emotion analysis a parallel to contemporary developments, although the inextricability comprehension of mind connecting to the body seems to be different to the alternative post Cartesian versions and check them out. What is interesting here is trying to apply the sigma structure to the emotional level, so that, each emotion, like each perception, should be interpreted as a mental activity that essentially refers to a somatic state, process or activity, just as a somatic state, process or activity refers to a morphologically defined emotional activity in the mind.

5. Aristotle's Account of Anger

T7. Charles (2021) p. 6:

The type of desire for revenge which defines anger is, in his view, an essentially embodied, 'hot' type of desire, defined in terms which explicitly refer to its being a specific type of bodily activity. Its form, in Aristotle's terminology, is captured in this definition. One cannot define its form simply as the desire for revenge without referring to it as an embodied-in-heat type of desire. The type of desire for revenge which defines anger, and constitutes its form, is, in his account, an inextricably psycho-physical, enmattered, activity with essential properties of the same type. Its form itself is, in Aristotelian terms, definitionally enmattered.

⁵ Koslicki (2008); Shields (2012); Reeve (2012).

Let us concentrate on some fundamental aspects of *De Anima* I 1 in the light of the foregoing. Aristotle begins by posing the problem that creates our ‘*aporia*’: are there passions of the soul that occur in isolation from the body, or are there not? For Aristotle, the soul can be an agent or a passive subject, it can act, produce actions or be subjected to them. Most of the soul’s passions seem to involve the body. Even pure thought does not seem to be exercised without imagination, and imagination is involved in the body. (Arist. *De An.* I 1.403a3-9)

T8. Arist. *De An.* I 1.403a5-10:

If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body, e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.

φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθέν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὄλως αισθάνεσθαι, μάλιστα δ’ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.

Aristotle is cautious. If it were the case that pure thought could not be involved with the body, then the mind could have a “separable” existence (*chōristē*).

T9. *De An.* I 1.403a10-12:

If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἰδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἰδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή.

It would be incapable of having a separate existence just like:

T10. *De An.* I 1.403a12-15:

In the latter case, it will be like what is straight, which has many properties arising from the straightness in it, e.g. that of touching a bronze sphere at a point, though straightness divorced from the other constituents of the straight thing cannot touch it in this way.

ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἄπτεσθαι τῆς [χαλκῆς] σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ’ ἄψεται οὕτως χωρισθὲν τι εὐθύ.

It would be like a straight line in geometry compared to a hockey stick if the soul were separated from the body. The hockey stick hits the tip of a hockey ball. The straight line does not have a point of contact with the geometric sphere. This is the sigma structure in action. Just as the stick is different from the straight line, the nasal concavity (snubness) is different from the geometric concavity.

T11. *De An.* I 1.403a15-19:

The mind it cannot be so separated at all, since it is always found in a body (μετὰ σώματός τινος). It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body-passion, anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body (πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα).

ἀχώριστον γὰρ, εἴπερ αἰεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινος ἐστίν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμὸς, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.

In the list of emotions, perception, desire and thought, there is a dichotomy between the separability or inseparability of the mind from the body. The indivisibility of the mind is formulated here in theory. The mind cannot be separated from the body – except in certain circumstances, as we shall see – by abstraction in the way that we can abstract from the nose its concavity in its geometry and from the stick its rectilinearity. In the case of anger, we can also isolate the desire for revenge from the boiling of the blood. But the research project must aim at an essence that is “enmattered formulae” or embodied *eidē* (*ennuloi logoi*).

T12. Charles (2021) p. 20:

Sometimes one is not stimulated or made afraid by great external misfortunes. But sometimes one is moved by small and insignificant things, when the body is stirred up (*orgai*) and is in the type of condition one is in when angry. Sometimes, even when nothing frightening happens, one is in the emotional states of one afraid.

T13. *De An.* I 1.403a19-27:

In support of this is the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt. (μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι).

a) On others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. (ἐνίστε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχη ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται).

b) Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. (ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου).

c) From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulae. (εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν).

d) It follows that their definitions will be of this type: to be angry is a certain kind of process of a body of this type (or a part or a capacity of it) brought about by this for this goal. (ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον “τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησις τις τοῦ τοιοῦδι σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε”).

6. Hypersensitive Killing Machine

T14. Charles (2021) p. 8:

Achilles (to take the case of a famously angry person) would not be a properly unified subject, endowed with an integrated capacity to respond appropriately when wronged. In Aristotle's view, by contrast, Achilles' capacity for anger is an inextricably psychophysical capacity of an inextricably psycho-physical subject, an essentially integrated organism with its own unified teleological goals. A capacity of this specific type is required to generate the one unified activity that ensued before the walls of Troy.

Aristotle sees Achilles as a psycho-physical unity,⁶ where his mental and physical states are intertwined and inseparable. This integrated nature means that Achilles's anger is not just an isolated emotion but a reflection of his entire being, influenced by his body, mind and soul in concert. This integration ensures that his responses are not only appropriate but also aligned with his overall goals and nature. Achilles's anger, then, is an expression of his *undivided self*. It is a part of his *telos*, or purpose, which drives him towards specific ends. This unity allows for the seamless generation of actions that are coherent and directed towards his goals. In the context of the Trojan War, this means that his anger and subsequent actions are not random or disjointed but are part of a unified activity stemming from his *undivided self*. His assault on the walls of Troy is thus a manifestation of his coherent and unified psycho-physical nature, embodying his teleological drive towards achieving honour and responding to perceived slights in a manner consistent with his character.

⁶ Cf. Gill (1989).

T15. *De An.* I 1.403a25-b2:

That is precisely why the study of the soul must fall within the science of Nature, at least so far as in its affections it manifests this double character. Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surround the heart. The latter assigns the material conditions, the former the form or formulable essence.

καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης. διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο ὁ φυσικὸς [τε] καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργή τί ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀρεξίν ἀντιλῦπῆσεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον.

A physiologist would define an affection of the soul differently from a dialectician. The dialectician would define anger as the intention of returning pain for pain (*orexis antilupēseōs*) or something like that. The physiologist would define it as a boiling of the blood (*zesis tou peri kardian haimatos*) or warm substance surround the heart (*tou peri kardian thermou*). The physiologist assigns the material conditions (*tēn hylēn apodidōsin*). The dialectician assigns the form or formulable essence (*to eidos kai ton logon*). But this would be insufficient; for if the dialectician seeks to formulate well the essence of the situation, he should state its actual existence there as the embodiment of it in a material body such as it exists and can be described by the physiologist.

T16. *De An.* I 1.403b2-7:

This logos here of this type is the logos of the thing, though it must be embodied in such a matter (ἐν ὕλῃ τοιαυτῇ) if it is to be at all. Thus, the logos (formal cause) of a house is such that can be so formulated 'a shelter against destruction by wind, rain, and heat'; the physicist would describe it as 'stones, bricks, and timbers'; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material with that purpose or end.

(<οὕ> ἕνεκα τῶνδ᾽). ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιαυτῇ, εἰ ἔσται. ὡσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ' ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ' ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος <οὕ> ἕνεκα τῶνδ᾽.

The dialectician formulates the formal cause, the logos, of the house in the same way as he formulates anger. The house is a shelter against external causes of destruction: wind, rain and heat, just as he had defined anger as a tendency, inclination or intention to retaliate pain for pain.

T17. *De An.* I 1.402b25-403a2:

Dialectician point of view:

For the starting-point of every demonstration is the statement of the subject's essential nature, and definitions which do not enable us to know the attributes, or even to make a tolerable guess about them, are clearly laid down merely for argument's sake and are utterly formal and empty.⁷

πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὥστε καθ' ὅσους τῶν ὀρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μὴδ' εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηγται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.

The reductionist physiologist formulates the house in terms of matter. He may have a house in view, but he sees only stones, bricks and wooden planks, just as he can have in view an emotion in its total ontological meaning but reduces it down to the boiling of the blood or to a hot substance around the heart.

T 18. *De An.* I 1.403b7-16:

Which of these is the student of nature? Is it the one who speaks about the material, ignoring the form, or the one concerned only with the logos? Or is it rather the one combining both? But in that case who is each of the others. Or is no one concerned with the affections of material that are neither separable nor treated as separable? The student of nature is concerned with all the works and affections of a certain sort of body and a certain sort of material, while for other sorts it is someone else.

τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικός τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἐκάτερος; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μὴδ' ἢ χωριστὰ, ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικός περὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα τοῦ τοιοῦδι σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη, ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος.

There is a need for a point of view that analyses the inextricability of form in matter and the non-cancellable formal conditions in matter. Achilles is a *nomen agentis*. Anger and Achilles are synonyms. Just as in order to think about what *phronēsis* is we have to understand how the *phronimos* behaves, or by understanding *sophos* we understand *sophia*, so the indivisible self is understandable as a concrete being and not as a dialectically isolated substance.

T19. Arist. *EN* VI 5.1140a24-25:

We may arrive at a definition of prudence by considering who are the persons whom we call prudent.

Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβομεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.

⁷ Charles (2021) p. 23.

T20. *De An.* I 1.403b16-19:

The affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life, to which we have seen that such affections, e.g. passion and fear, attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.

τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως [εἶναι] ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζώων, ἢ γε τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει <οἷα> θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.

It looks like, agreeing with Charles, anger and fear, unlike the line and the square/the surface are very much like the snubness:

- (a) not being abstractable from matter and
- (b) not definable independently of matter.

7. Let Us Wrap Up

1) Cartesian dualism identifies and isolates two entities: *cogitatio* and *extensio*, which are so different that they cannot be thought of as compatible. For how can a being that is by definition non-extensive be related or connected in any way to a being that is by definition spatially extended?

2) This is why some expressions ‘psychosomatic phenomena’, ‘psychophysiology’, on closer analysis, do not make any sense at all, for they are connecting a physical body with a disembodied mind. The meaning of which corresponds to the expression ‘squaring the circle’: *eidē enmūla* ‘enmattered essences (or forms)’ (Charles 2021, p. 6).

3) Therefore, interpreting Aristotle’s self or the relationship between *psychē* and *sōma* based on Cartesian dualism is anachronistic.

If this conclusion is correct, we understand far better Hector’s murder and the degrading treatment of his body in light of Achilles’s desire for revenge. We get what Achilles went through, the tension, the boiling blood, the hot substance around his heart, the inextricable emotion: the desire for revenge that each of us knows so well. Achilles’s intention has a motive, it has an occasion, it has a perpetrator, it has an agent, it has an end, it has the power to be in control of the action. The efficient cause and the final cause are determined by the inextricable relation between desire for revenge (formal cause)

and the boiling of the blood (material cause)⁸ in this kind of body. We need to think about the concrete situation that triggers anger (efficient cause: death of Patroclus). We need to put ourselves in Achilles's shoes. Achilles is "a hypersensitive killing machine".⁹

8. *Phenomena Generated in the Soul (EN II 4.1105b19-1106a7)*

Aristotle identifies *pathos* as one of the three phenomena generated in the soul (*ginomena en tēi psychēi*), alongside *dynamis* and *hexeis*. Aristotle seeks to identify ethical excellence as a *hexis* (state of having). I aim to study the applicability of the S-structure model and the inextricability thesis to the different levels of the *psychē*'s involvement (*dynamis*, *pathos*, and *hexeis*) with what can emotionally happen to us. *Pathē*, *dynamis* and *hexeis* are structures of the human soul, and they can be articulated in relation to each other. What is specifically the relationship between *pathos*, *dynamis* and *hexeis*? The experience begins with *pathos* and ends in *pathos*, regardless of the level considered. Therefore, between *dynamis* and *hexis* lies *pathos*. If we accept that *aretē* is the best possible choice for an action and *kakia* is the worst, what is their relationship on the emotional pathological level? The analysis of *pathē* is decisive for understanding the practical horizon (*praxis*). But in what way? Is there a pathological plasticity in the way we experience *pathē*?

8.1 *Pathos*

T21. *EN II 4.1105b19-23:*

I speak of such affections as desire, anger, fear, audacity, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, compassion, and, in general, everything accompanied by pleasure or suffering. ὅλως οἷς ἐπεται ἡδονή ἢ λύπη.

1) Emotions, with their multiplicity of content, shape our experiences. They involve us, leaving us in certain states and creating lasting impressions within us.

⁸ Cf. Henry (2020).

⁹ "Achilles, the most hypersensitive killing machine in the history of warfare": Meyer (2003) p. 5.

2) The diverse configurations in which emotions manifest have distinct outlines, closely linked, yet clearly different, such as envy and jealousy. These are well-known phenomena.

3) Feelings and emotions are formally defined, though not abstractly. Emotions (affections, feelings) give rise to impressions, leave us in specific mental states and shape life situations.

These are phenomena that, in general, are accompanied by pleasure or suffering. Each emotional experience is typically accompanied by either pleasure or pain. In a corresponding passage of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle states that *pathē*:

T22. *EE* 1220b12-14:

Are phenomena such as wrath, fear, shame, and desire, that in general are accompanied by a perceptive pleasure or a perceptive suffering from their own constitution, in and of themselves.

λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά.

That is, *pathē* are perceptive phenomena, neither blind nor empty. The soul's affections are endowed with a 'sensitive' element. There is an apperception peculiar to any pleasure and pain accompanying each emotion, which differs from a purely theoretical and cognitive evaluation or apperception of pleasure and suffering. Emotions intrinsically carry within themselves (*kath' hauta*) the sensation (*aisthēsis*) of each content (sweet or sorrowful).

T 23. *EE* 1221b36-37:

The passions are defined by suffering and pleasure.

τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διώρισται.

It is within the intimacy of each passion, so to speak, that one finds an apperception of the intrinsically particular way it affects us and leaves us in a certain state. That which is impressive makes an impression on us, carrying with it the possibility of its own interpretation. An emotion is both perceptive and perceivable, as it manifests and discloses its presence within us, allowing us to sense what is happening to us, who is affecting us and how it all unfolds.

The S-structure and the thesis of the inextricable relationship between body and soul are at work here. As we saw in *De Anima* A.1, hylomorphism accounts not only for how a *pathos* is described as psychological content but also for how it objectively and physiologically occurs in the body. The qualitative interrelation between body and soul precedes the dual accounts of emotions. However, the implication is even deeper. Every emotion constitutes an intentional desire (*orexis*) for either pursuit (*diōxis*) or flight (*phygē*). We try to avoid and escape situations or objects when we feel the threat of suffering, and we pursue when we feel the promise of pleasure. The world's intelligibility implicates us sensorially and perceptively in each of its contents, as well as in the interpretative mobility of pursuit and escape. If this is correct, every time we feel like 'something', this 'something' is different for each person and in each instance, yet we all understand the potential pleasure and suffering it triggers.

Apperception is a dynamic concept, so to speak. It is not just a theoretical notion, but rather a type of desire (*orexis*). Every emotion carries a certain level of pleasure or pain that shapes each situation in which we find ourselves; however, the pleasure and pain we experience are determined by our pursuit or avoidance of them. This is precisely how we could have desiring (*orexis*) and thinking (*dianoia*) in the same structuring level.

T24. *EN* VI 2.1139a21-22:

It is precisely the same (*ὅπερ*) what in thought is affirmation and negation, what in *orexis* is pursuit and flight.

ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγή.

8.2 *Dynameis*

T25. *EN* II 4.1105b23-25:

Potencies (*δυνάμεις*) are the conditions of possibility of our being affectable by affections. We say according to each *δύναμις*, we can become angry, suffer, or feel compassion.

δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἅς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἅς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσθαι.

Dynamis is the capacity we have to be affected by certain emotions (*pathē*). There is for each of us a unique way that we are affected by emotions. Each emotion leaves an impression on us, putting us in a particular state. Without

such a condition, the possibility of being affected would be non-existent, rendering us unable to be affected in certain ways. Conversely, we can recognize that some *pathē* may disturb us intensely, while others leave us indifferent. Whether we pursue certain pleasures (*hēdonai*) and avoid certain pains (*lupai*) depends on whether we are susceptible of being affected (*pathētikoi*) by or likely to take pleasure in or suffer from them. The specific content of the pleasure pursued, or the suffering avoided can differ from person to person and may also change over the course of an individual's life. What brings pleasure or suffering to one person may not affect another person at all.

The formulations of the *Eudemian Ethics* seem to make it clear that *dynamais* are the conditions of possibility for having the experience of a specific content of affection.

T26. *EE* II 4.1221b35-37:

For the faculties and the states are concerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions are distinguished by pain and pleasure.

αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διώρισται.

There is no abstract relationship between the condition of possibility, capacity or faculty, on the one hand, and emotions in general, on the other. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, capacity is conceived as the specific possibility of being affected by a specific emotional content. The composition is as follows: real content: battle; emotion: fear. The capacity is not merely the possibility of feeling fear but the possibility of feeling fear in the given circumstances in which someone finds themselves on the battlefield. Feeling fear affects the battlefield and also affects the person who has the capacity to be frightened and feel fear.

8.3 *Hexeis*

T27. *EN* II 4.1105b25-28:

The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill-disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.

ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνεπιμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ-ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα.

In the *EE* formulation:

T28. *EE* II 2.1220b7-10:

it will be in respect of our faculties (*δυνάμεις*) for emotions according to which people are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the dispositions (*ἕξεις*) according to which people receive certain designations in respect of emotions, because of their experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι.

Each emotion has *pathēmata* as its specific content (*nomen rei actae*), triggering specific reactions. The emotional *definibilia* are interpreted and understood in their *morphē* as pleasure (*hedonē*) and pain (*lupē*). Therefore, the proto-*orexis* we live in unfolds into different *orexeis*, leading us to pursue (*diōkein*) pleasure and avoid (*pheugein*) pain. According to the affective disposition (the specific way we relate to emotional content), we are good or bad, i.e., we behave well or badly in response to the emotions triggered.

According to the affective dispositions, we are well- or ill-disposed with respect to the emotions (*hexeis de kath' has pros ta pathē echomen eu ē kakōs*) (*EN* 1105b25-26). The *nomen agentis* is our way of dealing with the emotions. The way we become depends on our behaviour and attitude towards these emotions. The *terminus ad quem*, like the *terminus a quo*, involves 'emotional experiences', but it is no longer a matter of whether or not we have the potential for a particular emotion that can be triggered. Each emotional experience appears to be linked to a latent capacity that becomes activated when we encounter certain circumstances. The specific situation acts as a catalyst, unleashing what can be unleashed. We can navigate through various emotional experiences, some of which we may be indifferent to or unaffected by, depending on our sensitivity and receptiveness.

In the case of *hexeis*, it involves knowing how to handle a declared passion. You are already in a particular situation. The challenge is to determine how to manage your emotions, cope with what you are experiencing and make sense of the moments you are going through.¹⁰

¹⁰ The sense of 'ἔχειν' constructed with mode adverbs is intransitive. 'Πρὸς τὰ πάθη' expresses the specific content of the relationship category, indicating the nature of this content. Terms such as 'τὰ πάθη', 'τὰ παθήματα', 'ὀρέξεις', 'δίωξις', 'φυγή' and their respective

- 1) Every emotional content is now morphologically constituted by a *pros ti* that contextualizes every aspect of life.
- 2) The *pros ti* determines the way we experience every situation.
- 3) The *pros ti* is determined by how we manage our feelings: *pōs* (*EE* 1220b10). The adverbs “*eu*” or “*kakōs*” are precise determinations that can be specified and made concrete depending on how “*pathos*” is being experienced at a particular time (*EN* II 4.1105b25-26).
- 4) Irrespective of how *pathos* affects us, whether it is sudden and violent or almost unnoticed, it is our way of constituting our relationship with it—a relationship that cannot be undone and is constitutive of our condition—that determines whether we develop a positive or negative attitude towards that particular content.

According to the conditions of possibility (*dynameis*), we are susceptible to experiencing certain emotional states (*pathētikoi pathēmatōn*) and can at least experience one episode of ‘feeling emotional’:

- 1) we are liable to become angry. We can at least experience one episode of anger and being angry (*pros to orgisthēnai*) (*EN* II 4.1105b25, 27);
- 2) we are liable to feel depressed or in distress. We can at least experience one episode of sadness, depression, distress and being sad or in distress (*pros to lupēthēnai*) (*EN* II 4.1105b25, 1106b20) and
- 3) we are liable to feel pity or compassion. We can at least experience one episode of pity, compassion and pitying someone (*pros to eleēsai*). (*EN* II 4.1105b27, 1106a25).

Now, in accordance with our affective dispositions (*hexei*), we find ourselves in a second-order relationship. The issue is not whether we are angry, distressed or compassionate, as these are emotions, we indeed experience, but rather how we are to deal with or behave in response to what we feel. We can, therefore, expand the formula: in respect to all emotional experiences (*pros ta pathē*), how do we deal with them? How do we behave in response

contents, like ‘ἡδονή’ and ‘λύπη’, are not viewed as being driven by a ‘δύναμις’ that compels us to feel in a certain way.

to all emotional experiences? The answer is formally well- or ill-disposed (*echomen eu ē kakōs*). However, for each situation, our relation to the given emotions depends on our understanding of and coping with what we feel.

T29. *EN* II 4.1105b25-28:

For instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.

ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἅς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα.

There is a good and badly way to deal with:

- 1) anger (*orgē*)
- 2) distress (*lupē*)
- 3) pity or compassion (*eleos*).

Misbehaviour with regard to anger (*orgē*) depends on our reaction of excess or defect (*ei men sphodrōs ē aneimenōs*). We have the correct attitude if our response neither exceeds the appropriate measure nor falls short of what is deserved. We behave well if we feel a moderate amount of anger (*ei de mesōs, eu*). The same holds true for other emotions (*homoios de kai pros talla*).

9. Active Assimilation (Homoiosis) in De Interpretatione I 1

Aristotle precisely addresses this complex involvement in *De Interpretatione* when he equates the coming into being of mental affections such as perceptions, desires, emotions and thoughts with ‘likenesses’ or ‘assimilations’ of objects (*pragmata*). I would now like to delve into this relationship between mental affections (*pathēmata tēs psychēs*) and objects (*pragmata*). What is the meaning of (*homoiosis*)? Can we straightforwardly translate it as conformity (*adaequatio*). Truth is the conformity of a thing and the intellect (*adaequatio res et intellectus*). What is the meaning of the verb *homoioō*? In the active sense, it means ‘to make like’, and in the passive sense, ‘to be made like’. To assimilate seems to work both ways, from inside our minds to the outside world and from the outside world into our minds.

The perception of a nose, the desire for revenge and feeling pity are affections of the mind. A nasal concavity, an insult and a sad event are objective situations (*pragmata*). Affections of the mind and objective situations (in the world, outside our minds) are likened to each other. The *pragma* is already understood in our minds. The affections (*pathēmata*) are objectively referred to the objective situations occurring.

T 30. *De Int.* 16a3-8:

There are, first of all, in the voice symbols of the affection that exist in the mind, just as written words are symbols of the symbols that exist in the voice. And just as even the written words are not the same for all human beings, neither are the spoken words the same. Yet the affections of the mind of which the written and spoken words are signals are the same for all human beings. So, too, there is identity in the things of which the affections are assimilations.

Εστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτα.

Let us break down this passage:

- 1) Written words are symbols of spoken words.
- 2) Words are signals of the affections of the mind.
- 3) Languages made up of spoken and written words are not the same for all human beings.
- 4) Affections of the mind (*pathēmata tēs psychēs*) are the same for all human beings (*tauta pasi*).
- 5) States of affairs (*pragmata*) are the same for all human beings.
- 6) Mental affections are assimilations (*homōiomata*) of states of affairs.

There thus seem to be affections (*pathēmata*) in the mind, on the one hand, and objects (*pragmata*), on the other. Anachronistically, we can add that it is not just about objects or parts of objects, but also about states of affairs, circumstances, conjunctures and extramental situations. However, mental affections are inseparable from objects. Mental affects are expressed in objects, just as objects are mentally constituted. There is no *pathēma* that does not refer to a *pragma*, and there is no *pragma* that is constituted without requiring or admitting a mental affection. The relationship of assimilation

operates in both directions: from extramental objective reality to the mind, and from within the mind to the external world. What we experience is already the assimilable or ‘assimilating’ situation in which the mind is inextricably intertwined with the *pragmata*, and the *pragmata* are already interpretable in the mind. The S-structure governs this relationship. There are not two different realities here, two substances or two properties with different qualities. The *pathēmata* are inseparable from the *pragmata*. For *pragmata* to be *pragmata*, they must affect the mind – they are mental affections. We find ourselves in the correlation of assimilation. Assimilation is the interface between mind and body, and extramental contents.

We find a similar formulation in Aristotle when we read:

T31. *De An.* III 8.431b29:

The stone is not in the mind, but the form of the stone is.

οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος.

What is in the mind is the *eidōs* of the stone. In this sense, it is about understanding the relationship between the stone and the mind through the *eidōs*. Is it the *eidōs* that differentiates geometric concavity from nasal concavity? In any case, it seems we can assert that the *eidōs* lies between the mind and the stone. We perceive the stone from a distance, from a certain point of view (from above), cutting out its silhouette with our gaze, the outline defined by the encounter between perspective and the stone.

The assimilation of a stone by perception is possible because perception enables us to perceive a stone from a particular perspective. The stone presents itself in a specific aspect. I do not perceive the stone in its entirety; I can only see the side of it facing me, which lies between my point of view and the stone’s surface. How is it possible for assimilation to occur between my perception and the stone? How is it possible for an act of the soul to assimilate a being in the world? The stone is not in my head. It is the form of the stone that is in the mind (*psychē*). This can also happen with an entire city. I can leave Lisbon, but Lisbon does not leave me.

T32. *De An.* III 8.431b21-23:

Let us say again that the soul is in a sense all existing things; for what exists is either object of perception or objects of reason; and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge, and perception the objects of perception.

πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἐστὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητὰ πως, ἢ δ' αἰσθησις τὰ αἰσθητὰ.

The model of the S-structure can be seamlessly applied here. Soul and body are inextricably linked. The close relationship between soul and body (one's own body and other beings in the world) enables the actualization of mental acts such as perception, emotion, volition, thought and matter (both organic and inorganic). The relationship between *pathēma* and *pragma* is one of assimilation. *Homoiōsis*, when applied to noses or bowls, allows for different interpretations of formal geometric configurations ('concavity' and 'convexity'). A nose is snub and not concave, a nose is aquiline and not convex, and so on. The same applies to emotions. When we get angry, we are affected and project our feelings onto the world: whether at a politician on television, a driver in traffic or in any other context. Psychology defines 'anger', but it is experienced differently by people with anger issues compared to so-called ordinary people. Anger is different every time we experience it. The relationship between psychic *morphē* and hyletic content is already inextricable. If this interpretation holds, the isolation of each of the two elements (*pathēma* and *pragma*) comes later. In the Aristotelian sense, however, the world seems to be a psychic content. The same is true of desire, emotions and thinking.

10. *Diathesis* (*Metaph.* Δ 19.1022b1-3)

T33. *Metaph.* Δ 19.1022b1-3:

'Disposition' (διάθεσις) means arrangement (τάξις) of that which has parts, either according to space (κατὰ τόπον) or according to potentiality (κατὰ δύναμιν) or according to form (κατ' εἶδος). It must be a kind of position (θέσις), as indeed is clear from the word disposition. Διάθεσις λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ' εἶδος. θέσιν γὰρ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι, ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα δηλοῖ ἢ διάθεσις.

Describing the phenomenon identifies a basic structure S. X has parts. X possesses the elementary parts it has included. The intrinsic organization

(*taxis*) points to a positive possibility of a relationship between the elements. The elements are in relation to each other and to the whole.

Arrangement (*taxis*) produces intrinsic organization in three ways:

- 1) according to their place (*kata topon*);
- 2) according to their potentiality (*kata dynamin*);
- 3) according to their aspect (*eidōs*) or form (*kat' eidōs*).

Diathesis affects each of these horizons. When it occurs, it impacts the place, the possibilities and the aspects (*eidē*) of the whole situation we are in (*pragma*). *Diathesis* is a horizon that allows for changes, modifications and transformations within it. *Diathesis* affects the whole situation we are in. If we take emotions as an example,

A) such as anger, we understand that it transforms each of these fundamental structures. For example, when a car driver performs a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre, we feel the adrenaline rush, our blood boiling and the desire for revenge. The road ceases to be merely a means for us to reach our destination. The functional possibility of the road becomes 'blind'. We scream at the driver, wanting to make him pay for what he has done.

B) Similarly, with craving, when I have a massive craving for coffee, the space I am working in loses its sense of habitation. The kitchen appears on the horizon as the place that offers me coffee. The room I work in no longer holds this possibility; it is the kitchen that provides it. The aspect or form of things changes completely. The place I am in tells me nothing; the place I want to go offers me the prospect of possibility.

C) A friendly smile makes a place welcoming.

The street, the office, the kitchen or a meeting with someone may not inherently change our disposition. However, when they do, they affect the place where we are and the possibilities they offer (driving, studying, drinking coffee, socializing with someone). The usual aspect of things changes we may not even see the road, and the place where we meet someone pleasant changes the look of things, and so on. The S-structure is always involved in

transforming the ‘definibile’. It happens to me that I find myself in this position, having the internal organization of things either in their proper places or out of them. I either fit where I am, or I feel inadequate. I can endure where I am, or I cannot stand being there. The appearance of things affects everything. Mood has a structural emphasis on ‘having’, on a ‘*ratio habendi*’ (Bonitz). Therefore, the shape of the ‘nose’ of things changes for me according to what I feel when an emotion affects me.

11. *Hexis*

T34. *Metaph.* Δ 20.1022b4-14:

“Having” means (a) In one sense an “having” or “state” activity, as it were, of the haver and the thing had, as in the case of an action or motion; for when one thing makes and another is made, there is between them an act of making. In this way between the man who has a garment and the garment, which is had, there is a “having.” Clearly, then, it is impossible to have a “having” in this sense; for there will be an infinite series if we can have the having of what we have. But (b) there is another sense of “having” which means a disposition, in virtue of which the thing which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else. E.g., health is a state, since it is a disposition of the kind described. Further, any part of such a disposition is called a state; and hence the excellence of the parts is a kind of state.

Ἐξίς δὲ λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργεια τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὡσπερ πράξις τις ἢ κίνησις (ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποιήσις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξύ ἔξις). – ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἔξιν (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιέται, εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἔξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ’ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἢ ὑγίεια ἔξις τις· διάθεσις γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη. ἔτι ἔξις λέγεται ἂν ἢ μόριον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης· διὸ καὶ ἢ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἔξις τις ἔστιν.

‘Having’ means:

- 1) In one sense a particular activity (*energeia tis*) of the haver (*echontos*) and the thing had (*echomenou*).
- 2) It can mean a particular action (*praxis tis*) or
- 3) process (*kinesis*).
- 4) production (*poiēsis*).

In production or in the act of making, one thing makes (*to men poiei*), the other thing is made (*to de poiētai*). The act of making lies between both the active and the passive element (*poiēsis metaxu*).

5) *Metaxy* or the space in between.

This is exemplified as what is going on when we wear a piece of clothing. A person wears a garment. The garment is had by the person who wears it. Between the man who has a garment and the garment, which is had, there is a 'having'.

6) Disposition (*diathesis*).

This is that in virtue of which the thing which is disposed of is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else. E.g., health is a state (*hexis*), since it is a disposition of the kind described. Further, any part of such a disposition (*diathesis tis*) is called a state (*hexis*); hence the excellence of the parts is a kind of state.

The explicit relationship between *diathesis* and *hexis* can be understood from this perspective. We can begin to comprehend how the S-structure operates. There is a producing element, the active, and a produced element, the passive. There is a relationship between the acting and the 'acted upon'. This is not a mechanical causal relation of unilinear time. The relation of having to what is had covers a semantic field almost as broad as 'being'.

The process of walking is better described when we refer to the walker. Describing locomotion by pointing to the materials of the road or the parts of the body involved in walking does not fully convey what is happening. When we walk or see someone walking, it is easy to understand. We use our legs, placing one foot after the other, stepping on the ground, starting with the first step and finishing with the last. However, walking is not the ground. The wanderer's walk along their path lets us truly understand what is happening.

Every action involves both an agent and a recipient of the action. When an agent performs an action, such as walking along streets, running along tracks or going up and down stairs, it requires the intervention of the whole body. The material of which the road is made is inert. Moving the legs is necessary, but the interaction – a *hexis, kinēsis* – between both allows us to understand walking one's way.

Walking the streets like a pilgrim or a traveller requires an entirely different disposition. In Aristotle's analogy: wearing a coat. The coat is worn. I am wearing a coat. I have the coat. The coat has been put on. Having and having had implies understanding how to get dressed and undressed. This relationship suggests understanding how I fit into the clothes I am wearing and how well they suit me.

Everything we 'do', 'make' and 'act' has this structure. Reading books and having them read, giving lectures and having them delivered, being on the beach in the summertime, being at war. The involvement of each of us in an atmosphere is considered a *hexis*. In 6), we read about the explicit relationship between *diathesis* (the organization of place, possibility and aspect) and *hexis* (the condition, state and *habitus*). By having, what is possessed by the one who has it is arranged well or poorly in relation to another thing or person or in relation to oneself. This is exemplified by health. When we are in good health, there is a state of being, a good form of being, which allows us to inhabit life. When we are ill, the opposite happens; everything changes. On the clinical curve of our relationship to health, the states of health and illness exist. We can extend this to our relationships to life – whether the days and parts of the days, the seasons or the stages of life are 'inhabited' by us well or poorly.

12. Some Aporetical Questions

My objective here has been to delve into David Charles's analysis of emotional life. The aim was not merely to confirm or verify the veracity of his interpretative hypothesis or his exegetical work, but to understand how *psychē* has the power to transform phenomena both within itself and in extramental objects. What kind of phenomena are emotions, such that they not only occur inside our minds but also concretely affect our bodies, the objects outside our minds and the situations we find ourselves in? Is there any sense in talking about the difference between our point of view, the perspective it opens and the horizon it defines? Is there room to define inside and outside? Or should perception, emotions, desire and thought not be defined as separate entities but rather as interacting inextricably within a

unified psychophysical self?¹¹ From a Cartesian perspective, the *res cogitans* is opposed to the *res extensa*. The *res extensa* is divisible, material, corporeal and extensive. The *res cogitans* is indivisible, immaterial, incorporeal and non-extensive. For Aristotle, if we interpret him from a modern point of view, there appear to be phenomena that are, strictly speaking, ‘mental’ or ‘psychic’: *aisthēsis*, *mnēmē*, *pathos*, *epithymia*, *phantasia*, *dianoia*, *nous*. Conversely, noses, legs, houses and looms can all be described as entities of the external world. What is the relationship between phenomena of the *psychē* and phenomena that appear to be extramental? At first glance, it may seem that there are entities that exist exclusively and independently of *sōma*, and others that are strictly somatic or corporeal, without any involvement in *psychē*. However, there appear to be phenomena that must be understood as definitionally inseparable, not analysable into strictly somatic and exclusively non-somatic entities. The inextricability thesis of *psychē-sōma* means precisely that *one* cannot be *conceived* of without the *other*. Aristotle, it seems, understands the relationship between *psychē* and *sōma* in this inextricable manner. Therefore, what embodies the mind? What ‘minds’ the body, if we may phrase it this way? The S-structure operates on the ground of the inextricable relation between mind and body, allowing a better understanding of its variations: psychophysiology and psychosomatics. What we have seen in the emotional life of the mind, in structural phenomena identified by Aristotle such as *diathesis* and *hexis* is the working out of the inextricable relationship between mental affections and objects. The *homoiōsis* (conformity, assimilation) between affections and objects is possible due to the inextricable relation between mind and body. If I am correct in my application of the S-structure, proving the inextricable relationship between mind and body, perhaps I have highlighted a problem that we can only formulate here. The mind is somehow all the beings. Therefore, mind = *ta onta*. It remains to be fully understood how this is possible.

¹¹ Cf. Peramatzis (2011); Scaltsas (1994).

The idea of this parallel seems to be:

- A) one cannot define mental affections without reference to their objects,
and
- B) one cannot define these objects without reference to mental affections.

However, are the objects internal (forms without matter) in us? Or are the external objects external forms which we grasp?

From Charles's point of view, one could argue [A] and possibly [B]. It might be easier in the internal object case. It can be done in the case of external objects also (as in the case of danger, beauty etc.). Either way: this use of the S-structure goes beyond Charles's use:

- C) one cannot define mental affections without reference to matter, the body [embodied cognitions]
and
- D) one cannot define the relevant bodily affections [the type of blood boiling] without reference to the mental.

Let us take *phōnē* to be the physiological aspect of *pathēma*. The *phōnē* can be acoustic, optical and even tactile. The *pathēma* can be *aisthēsis*, *pathos*, *epithymia*, *dianoia* or *nous*. There are numerous elements to take into consideration with multiple possible relations at stake: affection (*pathēma*), thing (*pragma*), *pragma* expression (*phōnē*), *psychē* phenomena (*noēmata*).

1) Let there be a nose *pragma* A and concave shape, *pragma* B, i.e., the nose's shape. A is a nose. B is its peculiar concave shape. There are noses that are not concaves (e.g. convex). There are concavities that are not noses (e.g. lenses, spoons, etc.). When we describe or think of this particular nose as concave we can explicitly say: 'this nose is concave', or 'this nose has a concave shape'. The concavity peculiar to this person's nose permeates every bit of its flesh and covers all its spatial extension. The concave shaped nose is the referent (*Bedeutung* in Frege's sense of the word).¹²

¹² Frege (1892) pp. 25-50. Engl. tr. Frege (1980) *passim*.

2) Now, consider *pathēma* A and *pragma* X. A being an *aisthēsis* as a way of ‘getting’ to an object (*pragma*). X being the concave shaped nose of this person here in front of me. Now, we do not ‘feel’ the presence of an *aisthēsis*. We do not perceive our own perception of the X: this nose ‘is’ concave or ‘has’ a concave shape. We just ‘get’ the person’s concave shaped nose.

3) Let us take a further step. Consider that *pathēma* is a *mnēmē*: M. How does *mnēmē* relate to the concave shaped nose of this person I am recalling? I mean the person’s concave shaped nose as well. Sometimes I can ‘feel’ I am remembering but usually I do not ‘reflect’ upon it. The object of M (*mnēmē*) is the same as the object of A (*aisthēsis*), because both M and A have the same referent. What is different is the way of getting to X (a person’s concave shaped nose), for an *aisthēsis* presupposes the availability of the *pragma*, and the *mnēmē* does not.

4) No one would describe a nose as a geometrically shaped concavity. We ‘see’ in perception as in memory that it is snub. The meaning (*Sinn*, in Fregean sense) is different, though. But what comes first into our ‘eyes’, in perception as in memory, is the snub shape nose.

What is the relationship between *pathēma* and *pragma*? A *pragma* shows up in its full-fledged referential power: remembering Socrates’s nose as it is sculpted or seeing someone’s concave shaped nose. The relationship between any particular *pathēma* (*aisthēsis*, *epistēmē*, *doxa*, *mnēmē*, *hupolēpsis*) and the snub nose has a conformity to the nose as the nose (*pragma*) shows up being as it is in every single way we get it. The meaning (*noēma*) is embedded in the referent (*pragma*). The *noēma* is pervading in every single *pathēmata* of the soul. But what shows up is already the inextricable relation of body and mind, shape and matter. Therefore, we get at the *pragma* as already available as a snub nose. Can we infer that all objects are the content of thought and are thinkable (*noēta*)? Is this a ‘normal’ consideration of things as they are? Do we not see just snub noses?

E) It is only because we are inextricably embodied that we perceive the external bodies we do and in the way we do.

Let me argue in favour of the S-structure in the following cases.

- 1) Any mental act (*aisthēsis* – *mnēmē*, *hupolēpsis*, *doxa*, *epistēmē*, *dianoia* – *pathos*, *epithymia*, *orexis*, *orgē*) involves the S-structure.
- 2) The content of any mental act exists in spite of our ‘spatial’ localization in the external world or in the internal world. A fight in phantasy or dreaming has spatial contents: in front of, behind, right, left, above, beneath, inside and outside. A real event has emotional content. In the football stadium, supporting our team and opposing the other team.
- 3) Thinking of how we feel in any given situation anticipating, remembering it, feeling it.

Is it possible that I, as an undivided self, have the same way of perceiving, emoting, desiring, thinking as any other human being, or is my way different? Or does this question go beyond Aristotle? Being me is different from being someone or anyone else. The perception of a new white sheet of paper is the same due to being the sheet of paper in the world. The perception of a white sheet of paper is the same for any person who can catch the sheet of paper in her or his perception. But being the self I am, my perception of the white sheet of paper is mine, just as anyone else’s perception of the white sheet of paper is hers or his. Mine is not theirs, and their perception of an object is theirs and not mine. Can the S-structure of any content (external or internal) be the undivided self of each self and any self? If so, we somehow refer to the same sheet of paper, neutralizing the singular form it is perceived by any person or by the same person at different times.

T35. *De An.* III 8.431b21-23:

Let us say again that the soul is in a sense all existing things; for what exists is either object of perception or objects of reason; and knowledge is in a way the objects of knowledge, and perception the objects of perception.

πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητὰ, ἐστὶ δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητὰ πως, ἢ δ’ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητὰ.

Bibliography

- Charles, D. (2021) *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the 'Mind-Body Problem'*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Charles, D. (2023) *The History of Hylomorphism: From Aristotle to Descartes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, S.M. (1992) 'Hylomorphism and Functionalism' in Nussbaum, M.C. and Rorty, A.O. (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 57-73.
- Cooke, H.P. and Tredennick, H. (transl.) (1938). *Aristotle. Categories. On Interpretation. Prior analytics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Corcilius, K. (2023) 'Review of *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem*' by David Charles', *Mind*, 132 (525), pp. 387-94.
- Forster, E.S. and Furley, D.J. (transl.) (1955) *Aristotle. On Sophistical Refutations. On Coming-to-be and Passing Away. On the Cosmos* (Loeb Classical Library, 400). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Frege, G. (1892) 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, NF, 100, pp. 25-50 [Engl. tr. by M. Black, 'On Sense and Reference', in Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.), *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980].
- Gill, M.L. (1989) *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hahmann, A. (2023) 'Review of *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem*' by David Charles', *Gnomon*, 95 (3), pp. 196-201. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/101479498/David_Charles_The_Undivided_Self (Accessed: 15/10/2024).
- Henry, D. (2020) *Aristotle on Matter, Form, and Moving Causes: The Hylomorphic Theory of Substantial Generation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hett, W.S. (transl.) (1957). *Aristotle. On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*. Harvard University Press.
- Koslicki, K. (2008) *The Structure of Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marmodoro, A. (2013) 'Aristotle's Hylomorphism without Reconditioning', *Philosophical Inquiry*, 37 (1-2), pp. 5-22.

António de Castro Caeiro, The Snubness-structure and the Soul-Body Relationship

- Meyer, N. (Screenwriter) (2003). *The Human Stain* [Film script]. Miramax Films.
- Peramatzis, M. (2011) *Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rackham, H. (1926) (transl.) *Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rackham, H. (1935) (transl.) *Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Reeve, C.D.C. (2012) 'Aristotle's Philosophical Method' in Shields, C. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150-70.
- Ross, W.D. (transl.) (1984) *Aristotle. Metaphysics*, in Barnes, J. (ed.) *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Scaltsas, T. (1994) 'Substantial Holism' in Scaltsas, T., Charles, D. and Gill, M.L. (eds.), *Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 107-28.
- Shields, C. (2023) 'Review of *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem*' by David Charles', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 101 (2), pp. 508-11.
- Simpson, W. (forthcoming) 'Review of *The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem*' by David Charles', *Ancient Philosophy Today: Dialogoi*.
- Tredennick, H. (transl.) (1933) *Aristotle. Metaphysics, Vol. I: Books 1-9* (Loeb Classical Library, 271). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.