STAVROS PANAYIOTOU
University of Athens
s.panagiotou@nup.ac.cy

A LEVINASIAN CRITIQUE OF CRITERIALISM ABOUT PERSONS[1]

abstract

In post-Kantian metaphysics, several analytic thinkers argue that criterialism is both a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood. Criterialism contends that there is a specific subset of properties that determines someone's personal identity, such as social reactive attitudes, mental complexity (second-order volition), value in combination with autonomy, self-consciousness, communication, and (practical) reason. However, Emmanuel Levinas, a prominent continental thinker, argues that behavioral properties are not tests for, but are parts of the ethical ideal of personhood. Levinas insists that the acceptance of others (as persons) cannot be a conclusion inferred from a test procedure; acceptance of others means precisely refusing to submit them to such tests. Personhood, therefore, depends on otherness. It is the other that shapes one's identity as a person, and the infinite responsibility one has towards the other person calls for an ethical shift away from the subject and the categories of being.

keywords

criterialism, Levinas, ethics, ontology, responsibility

1 This article was presented at the conference *Exploring Personal Identity: Philosophical Perspectives and Insights from the Arts*, held at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, from October 2nd to 4th, 2024, in Section 2: *Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind*, under topic (v): "Is it enough and/or necessary to have an articulated mental life (self-awareness, intelligence, morality, sense of responsibility, etc.) to be a person?" I would like to thank Daniel Tore for his careful proofreading and editorial assistance on the final draft of this manuscript.

Phenomenology and Mind, n. 29 - 2025, pp. 46-54
DOI: 10.17454/pam-2905
https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind

ISSN 2280-7853 (print) - ISSN 2239-4028 (on line)

1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to explore whether any completion of the sentence "x is a person if..." may determine someone's personhood. To address this issue, it is essential to define and interpret several terms concerning personhood and personal identity. For instance, is there a specific subset of properties that determines someone's personhood? What are the conditions under which something that is a person at one time is identical with anything that exists at another time (Olson, 1997, p. 25)? Furthermore, there is an urgent need to evaluate whether it is sufficient to claim that these questions are justified within an epistemological as well as a metaphysical framework.[1] It is also necessary to articulate what constitutes their nature on *ethical* grounds.[2] This article aims to show that the analytic tradition of criterialism depicts a necessary, but not sufficient, perspective to justify the essential difference between persons, human individuals, and other creatures – particularly in ethical terms.

2. Criterialism and the Onto-logical Conception of Persons[3]

Criterialism, as a philosophical theory, contends that there is a specific subset of properties that determines someone's personhood. Criterialists claim that mental states are necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood. For example, M. Goodman writes:

> The list of conditions for personhood to be treated will be standard. Each of the conditions is to be viewed as a quality or attribute or characteristic possessed by all and only those beings regarded, and those beings to be regarded, as persons. The initial set of proposed conditions is as follows: (1) consciousness, (2) rationality, (3) ability to take and reciprocate a personal attitude toward another being, (4) the ability for complex

1 Epistemological question: How can we tell that x_t is the same as y_t. Metaphysical question: What makes it true that x_t is the same that y_t?

2 It is noteworthy that even some authors in the analytic tradition, such as D. Parfit (2011), shift their focus from personal identity to survival.

3 Concerning the conception of the person, see Mulhall and Swift, *Liberals and communitarians*, pp. 10-33. However, the notions of personhood, individualism, and atomism are quite different and complicated, especially between the philosophy of mind and social and political philosophy. Concerning the definition of atomism, see Taylor, *Philosophy and the human sciences*, pp. 187-210. Specifically, Taylor (1985) contends: "The term atomism is used loosely to characterize the doctrines of social contract theory which arose in the 17th century and also successor doctrines which may not have made use of the notion of social contract, but which inherited a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfillment of ends which were primarily individual" (p. 187). Regarding the notion of individualism, see Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 87-116.

> communication, (5) self-consciousness, (6) the ability for self-motivated activity, and (7) freedom of the will. The general consensus seems to be that this list comprises the overt necessary conditions for metaphysical personhood (1992, p. 75).

Several analytic thinkers strongly defend the above theory (Harris, 1985, pp. 16-17; Singer, 1993, p. 87; Tooley, 1972, p. 82; Warren, 1997, pp. 83-84) arguing the following: "The actual possession of the criterial properties is necessary and sufficient for membership of the primary moral constituency" (Chappell, 2011, p. 2, n. 4). Empowering this argument, and according to H. Frankfurt's view (1991), "The most essential difference between persons and other creatures can be found in the structure of a person's will" (p. 6). Frankfurt (ibid.), in addition to delineating the distinction between persons and other entities, asserts: "It is having second-order volitions and not second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person" (p. 10). In a similar manner, P. Strawson (1962) states that being a person is some kind of emergent social property: We are persons because we have and are the subject of certain reactive attitudes (pp. 1-7).[4] Whereas, G. Watson (1975) argues that volition cannot be the source of identification, as second-order desires seem to pertain not to volitions but to values (p. 216). Similarly, D. Lewis (1989) explains the act of valuing, maintaining that it is a mental, attitudinal state (p. 114). Additionally, he contends that if one does not want to desire a thing, one cannot value it. Thus, Lewis (ibid.) investigates not only second-order but also third-order or higher desires, thereby concluding that, "Valuing is just desiring to desire" (p. 115).

For criterialism, a human being is the only entity that possesses the capacity for reflective self-evaluation (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 7). Persons exhibit a unique ability to desire their desires – a characteristic that is absent in other creatures. According to Frankfurt, to qualify as a person, humans must possess a crucial presupposition: The capacity to form second-order desires or volitions regarding their will. Additionally, they merit moral consideration and respect by being autonomous. Therefore, Frankfurt concludes that only those capable of forming desires regarding their will can truly exercise free will and thus qualify as persons. This is the main reason entities lacking second-order volitions, such as wantons and robots, fail to meet the criteria for personhood.

Watson gives priority to a different presupposition of personhood in support of his theory, emphasizing practical reasoning, understood in a Platonic sense,[5] and the agent's values.[6] Watson (1975) points out that it is not volition itself but rather what is valuable and reasonable that distinguishes persons from other creatures (pp. 215-217). In a similar vein, Lewis attempts to elucidate the essential element of personhood by exploring the philosophical notion of value. The example he uses to illustrate is that of a lazy philosopher who desires fame yet remains inactive, contrasted with the mother who, despite having the first-order desire to drown her crying child, refrains from acting on it because she recognizes that it conflicts with her values. Through these examples, Lewis argues that persons shape their lives based on reasonable values, as advocated by Watson, while also considering their volitions, as proposed by Frankfurt.[7]

On the other hand, there is another branch of criterialism which postulates that, in order to identify the conditions for personhood, one must first elucidate several terms related

4 See also Hacker, *Strawson's concept of a person*, pp. 21-29.

5 Concerning Plato's account of persons see Gerson, *Knowing persons*, pp. 50-98.

6 For a detailed definition of practical reasoning see Rice, *Practical reasoning as reasoning*, pp. 49-52.

7 Concerning the relation between reason, value, and action comprising a person's will see Raz, *Engaging*, pp. 67-89.

to personal identity. Identity is commonly understood in terms of a relationship. It is the relationship that each entity bears to itself. D. Parfit asserts that identity is not a matter of degree. He contends that, while psychological continuity is crucial for personal identity, it cannot serve as its criterion because it is not a one-to-one relation. Consequently, he suggests abandoning the language of identity in favor of focusing on "survival", thereby circumventing issues with transitivity.[8] However, R. Swinburne approaches the problem of personal identity from a different perspective. He posits that personal identity is best understood in a logical sense, wherein minds or bodies – psychological and bodily continuity – may serve as indicators but are not necessarily sufficient or even necessary features for personal identity (Swinburne and Shoemaker, 1984, pp. 1-66). Swinburne believes that, contrary to Parfit, a person resembles something akin to a Cartesian soul or ego.[9] He unequivocally rejects the empiricists' conception of personal identity.[10] M. Johnston (1987) argues that personal identity is identical to personhood only if we consider persons as human biological organisms, not just psychological entities with memories and psychological traits (pp. 75-83).

3. Levinasian Ethics and the Critique of Criterialism

In post-Hegelian metaphysics, several thinkers argue that criterialism is a necessary, but insufficient presupposition for personhood. This is because the criterialist line of thought fails to provide a well-argued response to the question of whether infants, the senile, those in a persistent vegetative state, and non-human beings are to be included within the category of personhood. After all, these individuals do not meet the checklist requirements to be counted as persons, and yet we have strong intuitions that they should be. For instance, T. Chappell, a Levinasian reader, writes:

> To treat someone as a person is not to put a tick in the box by her name, to show that she has passed some inspection or met some standard of rationality or self-awareness or emotionality or whatever. Behavioral properties like rationality, self-awareness, and emotionality are not tests for, but are parts of the ideal of, personhood. To treat someone as a person is to engage with her as the kind of creature to which that ideal applies. Hence, to treat her is not, at the deepest level, a response to her behaviour at all but to her nature (...) Acceptance of others (as persons) cannot be a conclusion that we infer from a test procedure; acceptance of others means precisely refusing to submit them to such tests (2011, p. 12; 2013, p. 54).

E. Levinas (1990) argues that to consider a creature as a person involves taking an ethical attitude towards that creature, which, even before any behavioral evidence comes in, is already different from our attitudes towards creatures that (we think) are not persons (p. 295). Furthermore, the other person, that we recognize, has priority over our own personal identity, as it is through the infinite responsibility towards the other person that one finds their personhood (Capili, 2006, p. 700). Levinas (1969) vehemently rejects criterialism, as a flawed

8 For Parfit, psychological continuity is a criterion of personal identity if psychological continuity is sufficient of person identity: X is a criterion of y if x is sufficient of y. Parfit spends much ink on this issue. See for instance Parfit *Reasons and persons*, pp. 245-272; *On what matters*, pp. 83-129; *Personal identity*, pp. 3-27; *We are not human beings*, pp. 5-28; *Divided minds and the nature of persons*, pp. 91-98.

9 For instance, in Descartes, the self is the *I* of the *cogito* (*cogito ergo sum* [I think therefore I am]), the center of consciousness leading to self-awareness and intentionality. Descartes's *cogito* has been considered as the culmination of the cognitive dominance over metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics (Casey, 2003, p. 390; Smith, 2016, p. 97).

10 Swinburne dismisses the possibility of synthesized animals or the transplantation of souls into pre-programmed machines (Swinburne and Showmaker, 1984, pp. 196-197).

theory, since it falls into the realm of immanence (p. 254). According to Levinas, human beings are not worth as much as persons' relations to each other. Infinite responsibility transcends being and its immanence (Perpich. 2008, pp. 1-16). Levinas writes:

> Responsibility goes beyond being. In sincerity, in frankness, in the veracity of this saying, in the uncoveredness of suffering, being is altered. But this saying remains, in its activity, a passivity, more passive than all passivity, for it is a sacrifice without reserve, without holding back, and in this non-voluntary – the sacrifice of a hostage designated who has not chosen himself to be hostage, but possibly elected by the Good, in an involuntary election not assumed by the elected one (1991, p. 15).

Even an infant or an individual in a persistent vegetative state can be considered a person if they are accepted as equal interlocutors (Levinas, 1998a, pp. 4-9). The other calls me to an infinite responsibility before the totality of presence through an asymmetrical and nonreciprocal relation transcending the limits of knowledge and the immanent categories of being (Bonnett, 2009). Specifically, Levinas (1985), by saying "I find myself responsible", means "[a guiltiness that is] not owing to such and such a guilt which is really mine, or to offenses that I would have committed; but because I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. The *I* always has one responsibility more than all the others" (p. 99, emphasis added). Infinite responsibility is thus by far a combination between sacrifice and holiness – defining personhood as an expression of contempt.[11] Levinas writes:

> Ethics, concern for the being of the other-than-oneself, non-indifference toward the death of the other, and hence, the possibility of dying for the other—a chance for holiness—would be the expansion of that ontological contraction that is expressed by the verb to be, dis-inter-estedness breaking the obstinacy of being, opening the order of the human, of grace, and of sacrifice [...] It is in the personal relationship, from me to the other, that the ethical 'event', charity and mercy, generosity and obedience, lead beyond or rise above being (1998a, p. 202).

According to Levinas (1998a), humans are not merely beings capable of knowing and acting through mental states, nor do they consist only of brains and psychological attitudes (p. 125). What truly makes them persons is their readiness to be sacrificed for the other person, based on an ethical, asymmetrical and non-thematizable quality (ibid., p. 168; Barber, 2020, p. 36). It is the infinite responsibility towards the other person, not a specific subset of properties, that determines someone's personhood, as "The subject is infinitely responsible for the other [...] The Levinasian subject is responsible for processes that go beyond the limits of its foresight and intention, beyond what it willed or can steer" (Yael, 2014, p. 76).

As a phenomenologist whose major interest dealt with the infinite ethical responsibility of the human subject, Levinas places major emphasis on the ethical "voice of the other" which precedes reason, and as Kleinberg-Levin (2008) correctly states: "The voices that, in their absolute singularity, come before the voice of reason, in the order of time and in the order of the ethical relation, must nevertheless, in their turn, come before the court of reason" (p. 150).

11 This affinity between Hegel and Levinas is of immense importance. Hegel's notion of personhood—as an expression of contempt—is closely related to Levinas' ethical metaphysics of *traumatic* vulnerability (Hegel, 1977, §480, emphasis added).

Above and beyond fundamental ontology, Levinas states that ethics precedes any ontological *a priori* subset of mental properties (Erdur, 2020, pp. 273-276). He also emphasizes that the individual's acceptance of responsibility in engaging with the other arises from recognizing the alterity of the other as taking precedence over the rights of the self (Greisch and Rolland, 1993). On this note, Levinas (1994) defines ethical responsibility as follows: "To hear a voice speaking to you is *ipso facto* to accept obligation toward the one speaking" (p. 48).

Levinas attempts to transcend the notion of personhood on ethical grounds, refusing to reduce intuition to immanence. He avoids relying on ontological criteria such as consciousness and rationality, instead proposing ethical criteria to justify primary moral constituency. He argues that the priority of infinite responsibility for the other person is both a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood (Zhao, 2020, pp. 257-261). In contrast to criterialists' features of mental states, such as communication and action, as well as their insistence on ordinary morality, such as moral consideration and respect, Levinas "Speaks of a responsibility that goes beyond what it is possible to do, beyond my actions and their consequences, beyond the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary, to an infinite and irrecusable responsibility for the other" (Perpich, 2008, p. 83). The other always exists outside the domain of the "same" and, therefore, outside totality. Ethically, this means that no rational system can supersede the call to infinite responsibility that emerges from encountering the "face," which addresses the individual from a completely external position. The call of the "face" is profoundly objective and beyond the self's ability to understand and relativize the external dimension of being (Bloechl, 2000).

We can thus infer that it is not sufficient to merely have a specific subset of ontological properties based on knowledge and consciousness to be a person. Levinas (1998a) raises several objections to this argument, stating: "Knowledge only comprehends itself in its own essence, starting from consciousness, whose specificity eludes us when we define it with the aid of the concept of knowledge which itself supposes consciousness" (p. 58). Therefore, what makes me a person is the Levinasian ethical potentiality of a nonreciprocal asymmetrical relationship with the other and the infinite responsibility thus cast upon *me*. As M. Barber writes:

> The other is experienced as asymmetrically inviting me to be responsible, and there are various modes in which that responsibility can be fulfilled, only one of which is to enter into speech or reasoning with the other. Thus, my relationship with the other establishes a saying relationship, which affords the context within which anything is said and which, therefore, forms the setting for philosophy, science, and the processes of justification. For Levinas, insofar as such processes take place on a terrain common to me and the others, they indicate that the asymmetrical relationship of proximity has already been modified by the appearance of the equalizing Third person (2008, p. 632).

Levinas gives a major priority to relational intersubjectivity over fundamental ontology in order to define what it means to be a person. As M. Ruti (2015) correctly states: "The properly human, for Levinas, therefore begins when I transcend my ontology and begin to exist for the other. In this sense, ethics brings about a kind of crisis, upheaval, or suspension of being, which jolts me out of my absorption in my own life" (p. 6). Therefore, for Levinas, relationalism precedes individualism in all facets of the philosophy of personhood. And finally, as Chappell (2020) underlines: "If relationalism about persons is true, then criterialism about persons looks not just false but incoherent: It takes as a criterion of personhood what it only makes sense to treat as an ideal of personhood (p. 188)".

4. Conclusion

In summation, we can conclude that for Levinas, criterialism is fundamentally flawed because it fails to consider the "otherness of the other" as a criterion of personhood. Therefore, it is not sufficient to have an articulated mental life, that is, self-awareness, intelligence, morality, and second-order volition, to be a person. Levinas aims to show that relationalism precedes individualism. Everything starts from otherness and not from being itself. The experience and the perception of otherness, which cannot be absorbed by mental states, is, in Levinas's view, the basic idea of the philosophy of personhood. Levinas assigns primacy to external alterity, which is not a feature of knowledge but of ethics. In fact, radical alterity is the alterity of the absolute relation to the other, which demands our ethical response rather than a notion of "pure Being" as some impersonal inner reality. The thinking subject enters into a relationship with human beings escaping the representation and totalization of ontology. For Levinas, the thinking subject calls itself to an infinite responsibility beyond itself, which exists prior to mental states. Levinas is thus convinced that it is not sufficient to possess mental states in order to be considered as persons; it is the other who gives us this privilege.

REFERENCES

Barber, M. (2020). The second source of normativity and its implications for reflective endorsement: Levinas and Korsgaard. In M. Fagenblat & M. Erdur (Eds.), *Levinas and analytic philosophy* (pp. 29-54). New York, NY: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429462580;

Barber, M. (2008). Autonomy, reciprocity and responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the second person. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 16(5), 629-644. doi:10.1080/09672550802493728;

Baxter, R. (1988). Identity in the loose and popular sense. *Mind*, 97, 575-582. doi:10.1093/mind/XCVII.388.575;

Bloechl, J. (2000). *The face of the other and the trace of God*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press;

Bonnett, M. (2009). Education and selfhood: A phenomenological investigation. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 43(3), 357-370. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9752.2009.00698.x;

Capili, A. (2006). Emmanuel Levinas and the human person: On the philosophical conditions of war and peace. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 62(2), 697-711;

Casey, T. (2003). Levinas' idea of the infinite and the priority of the other. *Gregoriarum*, 84(2), 383-417;

Chappell, T. S-G. (2013). Knowledge of persons. *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 5(4), 31-56. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.203;

Chappell, T. S-G. (2011). On the very idea of criteria of personhood. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 49(1), 1-27. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00042.x;

Chappell, T. S-G. (2020). Personal knowledge. In M. Fagenblat & M. Erdur (Eds.), *Levinas and analytic philosophy* (pp. 166-189). New York, NY: Routledge;

Erdur, M. (2020). Levinasian ethics as first philosophy. In M. Fagenblat & M. Erdur (Eds.), *Levinas and analytic philosophy* (pp. 269-278). New York, NY: Routledge;

Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *Journal of Philosophy*, 68(1), 5-20. doi:10.2307/2024717;

Gerson, L. (2003). *Knowing persons: A study in Plato*. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

Goodman, M. (1992). A sufficient condition for personhood. *The Personalist Forum*, 8(1), 75-81;

Greisch, J., & Rolland, J. (1993). *Emmanuel Lévinas: L'éthique comme philosophie première*. Paris: Éditions du Cerf;

Hacker, P. (2002). Strawson's concept of a person. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 102(1), 21-40;

Harris, J. (1985). *The value of life: An introduction to medical ethics*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. doi:10.4324/9780203005606;
Hegel, G.W.F. (1977). *The phenomenology of spirit*. Trans. A. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Johnston, M. (1987). Human beings. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 84(2), 59-83;
Kleinberg-Levin, D. (2008). *Before the voice of reason*. New York, NY: SUNY Press;
Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity*. Trans. A. Lingis. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press;
Levinas, E. (1985). *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Trans. R. Cohen. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press;
Levinas, E. (1990). *Difficult freedom: Essays on Judaism*. Trans. S. Hand. Baltimore: The Athlone Press & John Hopkins University Press;
Levinas, E. (1991). *Otherwise than being, or, beyond essence*. Trans. A. Lingis. Dordrecht: Springer;
Levinas, E. (1994). *Nine talmudic readings*. Trans. A. Aronowicz. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press;
Levinas, E. (1998a). *Entre nous: On thinking-of-the-other*. Trans. M. B. Smith & B. Harshav. New York, NY: Columbia University Press;
Levinas, E. (1998b). *Of God who comes to mind*. Trans. B. Bergo. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503616882;
Lewis, D. (1989). Dispositional theories of value. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl. Vol., 113-138. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/63.1.89;
Mulhall, S., & Swift, A. (1992). *Liberals and communitarians*. Oxford: Blackwell;
Nielsen, L. (2023). *Bundle theory and loose identity*. PhD dissertation. Olomouc: Palacky University;
Noonan, H. (2019). Personal identity: The simple and complex views revisited. *Disputatio*, 11(52), 9-22. doi:10.2478/disp-2019-0001;
Olson, E. (1997) *The human animal: Personal identity without psychology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001;
Parfit, D. (1971). Personal identity. *The Philosophical Review*, 80(1), 3-27. doi:10.2307/2184309;
Parfit, D. (1984) *Reasons and persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press;
Parfit, D. (2011). *On what matters*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1017/S0031819112000423;
Parfit, D. (2012). We are not human beings. *Philosophy*, 87(1), 5-28. doi:10.1017/S0031819111000520;
Parfit, D. (2016). Divided minds and the nature of persons. In S. Schneider (Ed.), *Science fiction and philosophy: From time travel to superintelligence* (pp. 91-98). New York, NY: Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781118922590.ch8;
Perpich, D. (2008). *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9780804779784;
Raz, J. (2002). *Engaging reason: On the theory of value and action*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199248001.001.0001;
Rice, H. (1989). Practical reasoning as reasoning. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 89(1), 49-63. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.49;
Ruti, M. (2015). *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, other, ethics*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury;
Schonfeld, E. (2007). *The wonder of subjectivity: A reading of Levinas's philosophy*. Tel Aviv: Resling;
Singer, P. (1993). *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Smith, F. (2016). Gadamer and Levinas on the topic of sociality. *Sophia Philosophical Review*, 9(2), 95-109;
Strawson, P. (1962). Freedom and resentment. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 48, 1-25;

Strawson, P. (2006). *Individuals*. New York, NY: Routledge;
Swinburne, R., & Showmaker, S. (1984). *Personal identity*. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1017/S0028428900033151;
Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophy and the human sciences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Tooley, M. (1986). Abortion and infanticide. In P. Singer (Ed.), *Applied Ethics* (pp. 57-86). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1515/9780691233161-004;
Vezer, M. (2007). On the concept of personhood: A comparative analysis of three accounts. *Lyceum*, 9(1), 12-27. doi:10.5840/lyceum2007913;
Watson, G. (1975). Free agency. *Journal of Philosophy*, 72, 205-220. doi:10.2307/2024703;
Warren, M. A. (1997). On the moral and legal status of abortion. In H. Lafollette (Ed.), *Ethics in practice: An anthology* (pp. 91-102). Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.5840/monist197357133;
Yael, L. (2014). *The intersubjectivity of time: Levinas and infinite responsibility*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press;
Zhao, G. (2020). *Between virtue and the theory of subjectivity*. In M. Fagenblat & M. Erdur (Eds.), *Levinas and analytic philosophy* (pp. 253-268). New York, NY: Routledge.