This article reconstructs the genesis and subsequent development of the philosophical rivalry between Thales and Pherecydes, as it emerges from a complex doxographical tradition involving Aristotle, the Peripatetic school, and Platonic-Pythagorean exegesis. Starting from the fragment transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (2.46), generally attributed to Aristotle (Frag. 75 Rose³), which mentions Pherecydes as an antagonist of Thales within a list of intellectual ‘rivals’, the study shows how this initially minimal opposition was progressively elaborated into a paradigmatic pair in the construction of the history of philosophy. Aristotle’s treatment in Metaphysics Alpha and Νu plays a decisive role: Thales appears as the initiator of natural philosophy, while Pherecydes, interpreted as a ‘mixed figure between myth and rational inquiry, is situated within the debate between Aristotle and Speusippus on first principles. Later reception, especially in Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic contexts, radicalizes this contrast, transforming Pherecydes into a theological and allegorical authority opposed to the Aristotelian naturalistic approach. The article also shows how Late Antique tradition sought to reconcile the rivalry through pseudo-epigraphic correspondence between the two Sages, turning conflict into dialogue. Overall, the study illustrates how a minimal bio-doxographical trace was transformed into an interpretative device capable of structuring, by contrast, two major trajectories of ancient philosophy: the naturalistic line from Thales to Aristotle, and the theological-allegorical line from Pherecydes to Platonism.

This article examines the sources of Plotinus’ doctrine of extension, a central aspect of his Platonic dualism whose origins have received little scholarly attention.
This doctrine entails a distinction between two central concepts: the notion of body as primarily divisible or extended ‘mass’ (ὄγκος) and that of immanent form as secondarily divisible or extended quality (ποιότης). The article argues that, although Plotinus presents this doctrine as an interpretation of Plato, Timaeus 35a, its philosophical content is irreducible to the Timaeus, and that Plotinus rather employs, adapts, and develops concepts drawn from Aristotle. First, Plotinus’ notion of ‘mass’ finds conceptual and textual parallels in Aristotle’s Physics, especially in the discussions of place and continuous magnitudes (Books IV and VI).
Second, Plotinus’ distinction between bodies and qualities as primarily and secondarily divisible or extended represents a sophisticated development of chapter 6 of the Categories, where Aristotle discusses quantity and distinguishes per se and accidental quantities. Finally, the article shows that Middle Platonic authors (Ammonius Saccas, Numenius) had already employed Aristotle’s distinction between per se and accidental quantities in their anti-Stoic polemics, and that Plotinus’ engagement with Aristotle is far more sophisticated.

This paper aims to reassess the democratic character of Aristotelian political thought through the interpretation developed by Jean-François Champagne (1751-1813). While numerous studies rightly highlight Aristotle’s openness to regimes with democratic tendencies, many scholars remain hesitant to fully acknowledge this dimension. As a result, Aristotle’s defense in Book IV of the politeia – a regime positioned between democracy and oligarchy – is often overlooked or dismissed as a mere compromise or as a second-best alternative to the ideal regime outlined in Books VII and VIII. In the works of Bodéüs, Devereux, Meiksins Wood, and Balot, Aristotle is typically portrayed, following the Platonic tradition, as favoring aristocracy, often at the expense of countervailing arguments – such as the principle of cumulative wisdom presented in Book III. In response to such readings, this article focuses on the status of the politeia within the Politics, on the grounds that it incorporates prominent democratic elements. To do so, I first examine what this regime concretely represents for Aristotle, along with the political challenges it is meant to address. Second, I draw on key passages from Champagne’s commentary, which highlight Aristotle’s explicit promotion of the politeia – a regime treated, as Champagne suggests, with “une sorte de prédilection” – as well as his implicit promotion of it, evidenced by his undermining of the Platonic political project. In this way, I aim to support the hypothesis that, among the regimes surveyed by the Stagirite, the politeia may ultimately be the one he favors, thereby bringing the democratic dimension of the Politics to light.

This text is an authorial presentation of Marco Zingano’s Aristotle and the Rehabilitation of Homonymy: A Metaphysical Journey Through Words and Things (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2025), prepared at the request of Aristotelica. It aims to introduce the scope, structure, and main lines of argument of the book, in order to situate it within current research on Aristotle’s metaphysics and related areas. The book offers a systematic investigation of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy, arguing that it plays a central and constructive role in his metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy.
For Aristotle, homonymy does not merely signal conceptual confusion or linguistic ambiguity; quite the opposite, Aristotle develops a sophisticated account of homonymous notions to address a fundamental philosophical difficulty: the absence of generic unity in the most basic domains of scientific inquiry. The study argues that Aristotle’s response to this problem consists in a progressive ‘rehabilitation’ of homonymy, under the pattern of what the book calls attenuated homonymy: a form of homonymy mitigated by definitional overlap, which allows for conceptual unity without recourse to the genus-species model. Contrary to a widespread position on this issue, which ultimately rests on Alexander’s interpretation of focal meaning as the only intermediary between pure homonymy and total synonymy, the book’s central claim is that Aristotle employs a plurality of non-generic unifying devices, each suited to a different philosophical context. These include hierarchical forms of unity (such as focal meaning, serial order, and subordination), but also non-hierarchical forms (analogy and resemblance). Overall, the book contends that attenuated homonymy is not only compatible with scientific discourse but is, in certain domains, indispensable to it, at least as Aristotle conceives of it.

The present article seeks to demonstrate that the passage in Aristotle’ Metaphysics Theta (1048b18-35) which defends a distinction between motion (kinêsis) and activity (energeia) was not only well known by ancient commentators but also generated intense debate. The debate that is the focus here is the one caused by Plotinus’s critique of the kinêsis/energeia distinction, which can be shown to have the passage in Metaphysics Theta as its target, and the response of Iamblichus as recorded and seconded by Simplicius. This debate helps us understand the significance of the passage and clarifies its ontological stakes. That the passage dropped out of one branch of manuscripts and was therefore unknown to later commentators like Michael of Ephesus and Thomas Aquinas is arguably unfortunate; an appendix seeks to show through the examples of these two figures just what was lost.

This paper reconsiders Metaphysics Θ 6.1048b18-35 the controversial passage about ἐνέργεια vs. κίνησις, at the intersection of textual transmission, grammatical articulation, and ontological interpretation. Special attention is devoted to the program of Book Θ, which announces a reconsideration of δύναμις rather than a privileged treatment of ἐνέργεια, and to the specifically Aristotelian conception of actuality as a relational determination (ἐνεργείᾳ, κατ’ ἐνέργειαν). From this perspective, the passage introduces a mode of speaking about ἐνέργεια that sits uneasily with the relational ontology articulated in Θ 1-5. The paper further reassesses appeals to Plotinus and Theophrastus, arguing that conceptual continuity does not entail textual attestation, and examines the manuscript evidence and the status of the passage within Byzantine transmission. Taken together, these considerations suggest that Θ 6.1048b18-35 is best understood not as an original component of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but as a significant witness to an intermediate, neoplatonizing phase in the reception and transformation of Aristotelian ontology.